Values and Liberalism

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Draft, 2023-10-11

Chapter 1

Values and Autonomy are the Basis of Liberalism

Liberalism addresses two important topics in philosophy, namely, what a human being should consider in order to lead a meaningful life, and also, how a human society shall best be organized in order to promote the common good. Questions concerning values and morals are important in both of these topics, since a person's values guide their choice of actions, and since values such as solidarity and empathy are important for holding a society together.

In fact, the use of values may be understood as a way of reconciling two basic human desires: the quest for freedom of action, and the desire for living in the company of other people. A person's values can be seen as their constraints on their own behavior – constraints of their own choice, which means that they are compatible with their desire for freedom. At the same time, shared values in a group may facilitate cooperative behaviors among its members, and it can also make it easier for each member to understand and to predict the behaviors of their peers.

Shall a Liberal State be Proactive with respect to Moral Values?

Although the importance of values is universally agreed, there is a significant disagreement within liberalism with respect to one particular question in this context. The following opposite positions stand out:

the ortholiberal position: A person's values is a genuinely personal matter, and the state shall not attempt to influence their choice of values.

the paraliberal position: Because of the importance of shared values in a society, a liberal state has a legitimate task of promoting some values and of discouraging some others. This task is subject to certain, well-defined restrictions.

In the present book I shall advocate the paraliberal position, as I propose to call it. I shall discuss what actions the state may legitimately take with respect to values in society, what actions it should refrain from, and what may be the underlying reasons for its policies in these respects. One of the topics that will be considered is how a paraliberal state should act when a limited community among its citizens develops its own values that differ from those of the majority.

The major argument against the paraliberal position is that it enters a 'slippery slope' whereby a government that leans towards authoritarianism may gradually become more and more assertive in its control of public opinion. The answer to this objection, from the paraliberal point of view, is that the opposite policy is just as risky, since if a state disregards all value-related issues, then it will make it much easier for illiberal and authoritarian ideologies to establish themselves.

Therefore, and according to this argument, a liberal state must use a carefully crafted approach whereby it can strike a balance between these two risks. The present book is intended to describe the principles and the policies for such an approach which will here be called the paraliberal view of liberalism.

The Secular Origin of Morality

In its Amsterdam Declaration of 2022, Humanists International state the fundamental principles of Humanism in their sense of the word. The first article in that declaration describes 'morality' with words that may also be applicable for secular liberalism:

We accept that morality is inherent to the human condition, grounded in the ability of living things to suffer and flourish, motivated by the benefits of helping and not harming, enabled by reason and compassion, and needing no source outside of humanity.

This view of morality shall be assumed in the present book as well, but with an important amendment that results in the following wording:

We accept that morality is inherent to the human condition, grounded in the ability of living things to suffer and flourish, motivated by the benefits of helping and not harming, expressed verbally for the purpose of communication and consensus, open to revision according to the dictates of reason and compassion, and needing no source outside of humanity.

The last part of this wording commits to a secular view of morality, but the amended wording also expresses that there is not one single 'correct' morality (or if there is such a thing then there is no way for us to know it). Morality is not some kind of natural law. Instead, we hold that, being one of the expressions of human culture, morality is open to debate and to revision, in particular as the result of new insights as well as new conditions in the world.

This point of view is a necessary part of the paraliberal position, since if the state has a role in promoting some values and discouraging others, it must also be possible to challenge the official position of the state, and eventually to have it changed.

The Importance of the Topic Addressed

In the contemporary debate, it is important to demonstrate that liberalism can be very different from how it is described by its detractors. A concise description of

the paraliberal variety of liberalism can serve as a proof of existence for a liberalism that does not share the value-blindness of neoliberalism. In opposition to conservative and reactionay attitudes, it defends the view that critique and revision of values is a legitimate vehicle for moral progress.

This topic is important in several contemporary arenas. In the European Union, for example, there is an agreement that our Union shall be based on liberal and democratic values, combined with an openness for local variation, but we shall need much more discussion and many more concrete proposals in order to establish that common platform. Current ideological turbulence in other parts of the world – and not least in the United States – suggest this need is fairly widespread in the world of today.

Background and Structure of this Book

Reference

The present book is an abbreviated version in English of my previous book, *Värderingar, Liberalism och Islam,* which was published in Swedish language in May, 2022. Both that book and the present one were intended to serve two purposes. One goal was to contribute to the discussion about the development of liberalism in democratic societies, in view of its present challenges. The other goal was that it should be useful in a dialog with advocates of liberal interpretations of Islam, and with free-thinking representatives of that religion.

As a first step towards both of those goals, I thought it was necessary to formulate a clear and concise interpretation of liberalism that could serve those two purposes. Not an overview based on phrases such as "most liberals think that...", but a distinct statement of a comprehensive position. The choice of the paraliberal position, rather than the ortholiberal one, was the first step in that direction. Many advocates of Islam criticize the Western world for a disregard of moral values, and such critique must be met by describing and defending our view of morality. The same holds for movements that refer to themselves as 'illiberal'.

But even in our own culture there is both disagreement and confusion about 'Western values' or the 'national values' of various countries. The present book is not likely to resolve the disagreement or the confusion, but I hope that it will at least help to clarify the issues and to take the discussion a bit forward.

Since a well-defined vocabulary and well-defined positions are important for this enterprise, this book will introduce and use clear *definitions* of the key concepts being used here, as well as concise statements of a number of *premises* that characterize my paraliberal interpretation of liberalism as well as its intended range of use.

What is Included in the Concept of 'Values'?

When read out of context, the word 'value' tends to have quantitative, and even monetary connotations where a value can be assigned to an object. Sometimes it can be expressed in terms of dollars or euros, but at least it can be compared to other values in terms of 'greater than' or 'less than'. Moral values must of course be something entirely different. Concepts such as 'good' or 'bad' can be assigned to particular situations, particular actions, or particular types of actions, but we do not think of the concepts 'good' and 'bad' as values. Instead, the term 'values' refers to the very types of situations or actions that *are considered as* 'good' or as 'desirable', such as 'generosity', for example.

But the word 'values' also has a more extended meaning in ordinary language and when it is used in a moral context. This applies in particular to the plural form of the word, and it is demonstrated by common dictionary definitions. In the Collins Dictionary, for example, one of the alternatives in its list of possible meanings for 'value' is as follows:

The values of a person or group are the moral principles and beliefs that they think are important.

Oxford Languages states the following as one of the alternative meanings:

Principles or standards of behaviour; one's judgement of what is important in life.

It is this meaning of the word that will be used in the present book. Within the scope of definitions such as these, we shall also make a distinction between *static values* and *attitudes* as two different kinds of values. A moral principle that affirms the sanctity of all human life will count as a static value, whereas a standard of behavior such as 'always tell the truth' will be seen as an attitude.

Values and Autonomy

According to its name, liberalism is concerned with freedom and, in particular, the freedom of the individual. This means that it shall stand up for the defense of freedom, but also that it must have a view of how freedom ought to be exercised. The term 'autonomy' is often used for designating freedom in the sense that is intended in liberalism – a freedom that is combined with responsibilities and expectations and, therefore, with the application of certain values.

The paraliberal view uses the following definition of autonomy:

independent thinking and acting, based on knowledge and reason, and guided by responsible values and attitudes.

It asserts that every individual has an innate potential to be or to become autonomous. It also asserts, as an overriding goal in human life, that each individual shall be able to realize their potential in this respect.

Values in an Agenda-based Model of Autonomous Behavior

Values are used for guiding human behavior, but actual human behavior is more complex than just a collection of values and what they call for. Any discussion of values should therefore relate them to a 'model' of behavior, ie. an understanding of how a behavior may emerge from its constituent parts and its underlying principles.

In some simple cases, a 'standard of behavior' specifies a type of situation and an action that should be performed whenever that situation occurs. The rule "wash your hands before sitting down to eat" is an example of such a standard, or attitude. One can imagine a person – or a robot – whose behavior is completely determined by such situation-action rules. This is not how people normally behave, however, and in particular since human behavior has an important temporal component as well. People are capable of planning ahead, in the sense of deciding at one time to take a certain action at a later time. Moreover, people usually have expectations about what is going to happen in the future, so that they can plan their own actions accordingly.

Behavioral capabilities such as these can be described in a comprehensive way using an *agenda-based model* which assumes, first of all, that an agent is capable of having *goals* for their actions, and that they can construct *plans* or partial plans for how to act towards their current goals in the situation at hand. Making plans is a cognitive activity that requires an understanding of the situation at hand, which means that the agent must be capable of recognizing the characteristic features of a situation and integrating them into an understanding of that situation.

Since the world is in constant change, plans can not merely rely on an understanding of the situation at hand; they must also take expected changes in the world into account. A certain capability of prediction is therefore another essential component of human behavior. The current situation description, the anticipated future situation description, the person's goals, and their plans for forthcoming actions will together be referred to as the person's *agenda.*

The agenda-based model makes an additional assumption, namely, that the person is able to execute their choice of actions from the plans in their agenda,

and to change or extend the plans if the evolving situation so requires. This is the way for the agent to exercise their autonomy according to this model.

A complete plan would specify all the actions that are deemed appropriate for achieving a particular goal, but in many cases the human agent will merely plan a few steps ahead and leave the rest of the plan open until they can see how things go. Moreover, one must assume that agents can abandon a plan altogether, and that they are capable of keeping several plans active concurrently.

Our definition of autonomy mentions *independent thinking and acting ...* guided by *responsible values and attitudes.* This thinking and acting may be understood in terms of the agenda-based model, and it follows that both the thinking (making plans, for example) and the acting must be guided by the agent's own values. However, these values and attitudes are not considered to be included in the agenda; they shall be thought of as a separate thing which will be called the *moral stance.* Notice also that both the agenda and the moral stance are subject to 'independent thinking and action', so that the independent thinking allows the agent to revise the values and attitudes in their moral stance, as long as this is done in a responsible way. This view was also expressed in the amendment to the description of morality, earlier in the present chapter.

This conceptual framework is important when it comes to defining the aforementioned 'principles and policies' that are needed for striking the balance between the danger of the 'slippery slope' and the danger of illiberal subversion of a liberal state. This was stated above as the key issue for the present treatise, and we shall come back to it repeatedly in the following chapters.

Chapter 2

The Value Culture and Society-founding Values

The previous chapter started with a statement that a group may benefit if its members share certain values, for example since this tends to facilitate cooperative behavior among its members. But there are also potential disadvantages that may occur if the uniformity becomes too pervasive.

The balance between common values and diversity with respect to values will be the topic of the present chapter. It is a significant issue for the present book, given that in the paraliberal view, the state shall take a proactive role in favoring some values and discouraging others, albeit with certain restrictions. An understanding of the risks if the state overreaches in its attention to common values will be relevant when discussing those restrictions.

The Importance of Allowing for the Change of Values

One reason why uniformity of values may be an issue is that it is related to whether a society is able to accomodate those situations where a change of values, or at least an adjustment of them would be appropriate. For example, there may be situations where conditions in the world have changed in significant ways, due to new technical developments, or due to changing living conditions. Some values that were appropriate at an earlier time may become irrelevant or counterproductive under the new conditions. Changes in living conditions may include both the physical conditions, such as the availability of food and of adequate housing, and the social conditions such as the level and character of crime in the society in question.

New insights with respect to the effects of currently held values may likewise give reasons for changing some of them. It is important to realize that all such kinds of value change must be performed with respect to the current value system as a whole, if they are going to work out well. It is irresponsible to abandon certain values merely for the enticement of being frivolous. Instead, it is reasonable to retract a value if one finds that it is incompatible, under current circumstances at least, with other currently held values that are considered to be more important.

This is an important point in the context of the contemporary criticism of the morality in the so-called West, since several conservative ideologies argue that Western countries suffer from moral decay with respect to family matters, for example. It must be argued, in return, that our egalitarian views of the relation between men and women, and our tolerant views of homosexuality (for mentioning just a few of the contentious issues), are based on a moral stance and on insights about how traditional morals have led to violation of important ethical principles,

not least in our own societies.

The Importance of a steady Critique of Values

In a liberal society where the autonomy of individuals is an important principle, any change of values must be the result of a consensus in that society; it can not be dictated or requested from above. Obtaining such a consensus will never be easy, since different members of the society may be less or more open to reconsidering their current beliefs. However, it becomes particularly difficult if citizens have been used to thinking that values are intrinsically permanent, and that they must never change. Conversely, if there is an established and on-going discussion about the current values in the society, reappraisals are likely to be less difficult.

Such an on-going discussion ought to be *critical,* not in the sense of being against all values, but in the sense of weighing the arguments for and against the values that come up for discussion. In this sense we shall talk about the need for a critique of current values.

There is also another reason for such a critique of values: it is important for the transfer of values to the next generation, since values must be understood in their context and in terms of examples. If values are merely transmitted as sentences that are to be learnt literally and without any questioning, then they become dead phrases that do not provide adequate guidance. A live discussion about current values is the best way of preserving the relevance of the values, where the discussion may alternate between the rules as such, concrete examples of their use, and proposals for the retraction or the addition of such rules.

Value Culture and Value Communities

An on-going discussion about values in a society can be called a *value culture.* Such a value culture is important and valuable, according to the paraliberal point of view, which leads to the belief that a society should encourage the emergence of a value culture, as well as encourage citizens to take notice of it and to participate in it.

The value culture may exist both in small groups, or on the national level, or in many other ways. Critical articles or talks on value topics in public media is one example of how the value culture mayevalib-02x01 manifest itself. Discussions in social media is another example. But application of moral values, and short discussions about them, may also occur in many other contexts, such as in families, or in the meetings of civil-society groups whose main purpose is something else. Different groups will naturally address values of different kinds: the common values in an ice-hockey team will address different issues than the values in a society of certified accountants.

The paraliberal view confirms the importance of all such environments where values are applied and discussed, and they are characterized as *value communities.* In principle, a value community is defined as a community whose members hold values that are sufficiently similar that they can debate their values in depth, but where there is also a sufficient diversity of values so that discussion will be meaningful. Participation in one or more value communities is therefore recommended, both because of its personal value for each attendant, and also as a contribution to society.

Maturity

In order to participate well in a value community or in other aspects of a value culture, it is desirable that a person should have a few basic abilities, namely:

Human abilities, such as the ability for *empathy,* for *solidarity* in a group, and for *engagement* for humanity as a whole.

Social abilities, such as respect for the *dignity* of others, active participation in *communal activities,* and *respect for the law.*

Cognitive abilities, such as *open-mindedness* towards new facts and opinions, *good judgement, common sense,* and the ability to think and act *rationally* .

The word *maturity* will be used for the combination of these abilities. They seem to be founded in human nature, but they need to be developed further by the participation in good social environments. In particular, these abilities and attitudes should be present in value communities, which means that its younger members can evolve their maturity there.

Society-founding Values

The proposition that consensus about common values is in the best interest of society does not apply for all kinds of values. It does not matter much for society whether a strong appreciation of outdoor living is prevalent or uncommon there, and the same applies for people's interest in a particular kind of music, or in a particular style of cooking. If anything, a large variety of preferences, attitudes and values serves the best interest of society, in these and many other areas.

However, there seems to be some kinds of values that are particularly important for society, and where a reasonable consensus is very desirable. One type concerns values that are important for people's interactions with other people on a social level, also between people that do not already know each other. Another type concerns the attitudes and values with respect to the procedures of government, including the conduct of elections, the rules of conduct for elected officials and for how citizens will behave towards them, and so forth. These two types will

be referred to as *society-founding values* and *state-founding values,* respectively, although only the first one will be addressed in the present book.

Values that are neither society-founding nor state-founding will be called *personal values* or *professional values,* as the case may be. Values that relate to gender and procreation are often the topic of tension and controversy, especially since several religions take strong positions in these areas. We shall consider them as one kind of society-founding values even though they also have a strong personal significance.

Although concepts such as 'Western values' or 'national values' are often invoked, and considered by many to be very important, there is a regrettable lack of concretion when it comes to explaining what those values are, except for the case of controversial values that relate to gender and procreation. Therefore, the next chapter contains a catalogue of proposed attitudes and values (mostly attitudes, in fact) that arguably belong to the group of society-founding values. This catalog is intended as a proof of existence (i.e. that it is in fact possible to create such a catalog with credible contents), and also as an input to forthcoming discussions towards a consensus on society-founding values.

Chapter 3

A Catalogue of Proposed Society-Founding Values

The new and changing conditions for the human existence may lead to crises of several kinds, both for individuals and for states, nations, and other ways of organizing a society. In such situations it is important to be clear about what are the attitudes and values that we appreciate, and that we would like to hold on to, while at the same time being open to change when change is necessary. The present chapter contains a list of such attitudes and values that may be considered.

While contemplating such a list, the reader may think that it contains some attitudes that they would like to be universally accepted, and some others that they would not see as a norm; they could rather be considered as a matter of individual personality, or as a feature of a particular group. This is exactly what needs to be discussed in order to obtain a consensus, in a particular society. about its choice of society-founding values.

These proposed attitudes and values have been arranged in groups here, with a section heading for each group. Many of the attitudes resemble what is often called 'virtues'.

1   Right-mindedness

The following are three important attitudes in this group.

Honesty. This includes sincerity, straightforwardness, and telling the truth. It also includes not using vague or misleading statements for personal gain.

Reliability. In this context, this means honoring agreements that one has made.

Uprightness. This means that a person that has been entrusted with making decisions on behalf of the common, or on behalf of others, shall do so with regard to justice and the common good, and that they shall not use it as an opportunity to benefit their own interests. It also means the rejection of corruption, and of every model of society where local loyalties are allowed to guide decisions on matters of common interest.

2   Activity-related attitudes

Consideration. This means recognizing the consequences of one's forthcoming actions, as well as refraining from actions that may cause harm or serious dis-

advantage to others. Consideration therefore entails respect for the integrity of others.

Restraint. Lack of restraint is often described as someone "taking more than their share", for example taking an unreasonable amount of a distinguished dish at a buffet, or jumping a queue, or advancing as far as possible in a crowded traffic situation and thereby causing a deadlock.

Common to such behaviors is that they are not aimed at a particular person, but it is the whole that has to accept the disadvantages of one person's behavior. Restraint means that one realizes the consequences for the group, and that one refrains from doing what the group suffers from. The consequences include not only the immediate disadvantages, but also effects "if everyone were to do so". If the queueing culture is broken down, for example, then everyone will have to be pushy, which is a nuisance for everyone, and may be a strong disadvantage for some.

Willingness to cooperate and willingness to compete. When a considerable number of people have the task of carrying out an assignment of considerable size, 'willingness to cooperate' refers to a preference for organizing the work through collaboration, while 'willingness to compete' refers to a preference for letting it take place in form of competition between groups within the project. Both forms of work are needed sometimes, and they complement each other, but failure to cooperate seems to be more common than failure to compete.

Sense of fair play. An important property in all situations that have the character of being a competition.

Sense of responsibility and loyalty. A sense of responsibility refers to each person's responsibility for their deeds. This includes, among other things, an obligation to put things back in order when one has caused damage, to the best of one's ability at least. Loyalty can be seen as a sense of responsibility that is so strong that one accepts significant disadvantages for oneself for it.

These attitudes have in common that they require an ability to look ahead and to understand the consequences of one's own actions, as well those done by others, assessing these consequences on the basis of one's own values. This is the same capability of look-ahead as is assumed in the agenda-based model of behavior, which was described in Chapter 1.

3   Relationship-related attitudes

Open-mindedness - meaning an insight that others may have a different perception of reality than oneself, and that it need not be the case that one is right and the other is wrong. It can instead be a question of different perspectives that complement each other and that together provide a better understanding of the whole.

Open-mindedness is a fundamental principle in the paraliberal view. The opposite of open-mindedness may be called close-mindedness or cocksureness.

Reciprocity means understanding and respecting the other party's experiences, interpretations and assessments.

Tolerance. Analogous to open-mindedness and reciprocity: a readiness to accept that others may have different opinions and behaviors than oneself, and an insight that values and attitudes are culturally dependent. This leads to showing patience and good will even towards those who have a different point of view than one's own.

Reference   **Mutuality.** This term has been introducded by T.A. Aleinikoff in an important article. He explains it by saying that tolerance is not enough, and that there is also a need for open-mindedness and for an active interest in the other party. He writes: "Mutuality demands active engagement, learning about others in their own terms. ... (This) changes the observer".

Critical attitude with respect to norms. An uncritical attitude with respect to norms occurs when the behavior of the majority in a group is expected from each member there, and each group member applies it to . A critical attitude is the opposite: it means autonomy when it comes to adopting and retaining values, not absence of values. In particular, a critical attitude in this respect is essential for the ability of a value community to reflect on its own values and attitudes.

Concertive attitude. A concertive attitude may be adopted in situations where conflicting interests occur, and is characterized by trying to find a middle ground that both parties can be sufficiently satisfied with. This usually requires that each side is familiar with the other party's views and motives, so that they can jointly find such a middle ground. Reciprocity (defined above) is therefore a precondition for a concertive attitude.

The opposite of a concertive attitude is a *dominance attitude* where each of the opposing parties is only able to see two possible ways of resolving their conflict, i.e. one of the parties shall "win" and the other one shall submit completely.

Solidarity. Loyalty to a group of some size, and to its members.

4 Respect for, defense of the rights of individuals

Respect for the dignity of others. Every human being is considered to have an inherent dignity, but it can be violated e.g. by abusive treatment, or by forcing the person concerned to perform revolting actions. Every person has a right to avoid having their dignity violated. (The assessment of what is to be considered 'offensive' must however be made in consensus within the society; it can not be left entirely to the person that considers himself to be offended).

Rejection of discrimination. Discrimination is a complex issue. It does not seem easy to make a good definition of it, so this topic will be referred to a later occasion. It can be noted, however, that this point is related to the previous one since, in many cases, discrimination constitutes a violation of a person's dignity.

Freedom of movement. In principle, every human being has the right to move freely within the limits of their own ability. However, this right can be limited by society, for example for protection and for maintaining order.

Property rights. Through its legal system, each society establishes the principles for which tangible and intangible property is to be regarded as privately owned, and the rules that shall apply to the holding, transfer and disposition thereof.

Right of public access. A further clarification of the balance between property rights and freedom of movement: shall it be permitted to take a walk on open land that is privately owned, as long as one does not cause any damage there? This question is viewed differently in different parts of the world.

Equal opportunities. As far as possible, citizens should be given equal conditions for their desire to to create and shape their own life, regardless of traits that are innate, inherited, or otherwise is not the result of the person's own free choice.

Co-determination. In those contexts where several persons work together towards a common goal or to carry out a mission together, all participants should be given opportunity to participate in joint decisions on how the work is to be organized and shared.

Freedoms of expression, assembly, and religion. These rights have been as-

serted through international and or national decisions. Civic attitudes for the respect and the defense of these rights are necessary as a guarantee that they will be enjoyed by all.

5   Attitudes to knowledge and reason

Acquisition and care of knowledge. Active interest in acquiring knowledge and in applying it, as well as in contributing to unfounded claims being effectively contradicted .

Critical mind. The virtue of having a critical attitude with respect to norms has been mentioned before in this chapter. A critical mind includes this virtue, but it also includes the habit of examining the credibility of the statements and arguments presented, and of seeing whether there are grounds for questioning them. In addition, it also requires that when a person tries to identify the cause of a particular situation, they shall try to identify alternative possible causes and select the one that is supported by the best evidence. Jumping to adopt one possible cause prematurely shows an absence of critical mind.

Objectivity. In this context, this is taken to mean a readiness to listen to arguments and to examine them, not least if they contradict one's own hitherto perceived view. One shall do so regardless of who puts forward the arguments, and for what purpose. The opposite of objectivity is called prejudice.

Respect for science and for all knowledge based on solid experience. This attitude does not exclude a critical view, but it may require a critical attitude even towards those who reject established knowledge.

These knowledge-related attitudes are important, not only in connection with knowledge acquisition, for example in schools, but also in connection with the other attitudes described above. They are important in connection with open-mindedness, recognition and reciprocity, for example.

Adherence to the policy of public reason. The term 'public reason' refers to a policy, in society at large, whereby public debate and decision-making shall only be conducted in terms of commonly held concepts and beliefs, and a common understanding of reality. Tenets that are specific to a particular religion or philosophical stance may of course be used as arguments in the discussions among its adherents, but they shall be considered as irrelevant in public discussion and

discussion-making, for society as a whole.

6 Attitudes Related to Cultural Diversity

Cultural diversity occurs when there are significant differences with respect to ethnicity or religion within a state. Diversity is the normal situation in many parts of the world, both now and in the past, but cultural homogeneity (the opposite of diversity) is seen by many in the rich world as the natural and desirable state of affairs. Consequently, even moderate increase of cultural diversity may be seen as a problem, and it may also be blamed for problems of other kinds.

Cultural diversity is often associated with significant differences between the values in the culturally different groups of the population, which means that paraliberalism ought to have something to say about it. Moreover, migration is almost always the major explanation for an increase in cultural diversity, and in its turn, migration is often due to a degradation of the environment, sometimes also due to climate change. This adds one more important aspect to the topic of cultural diversity.

The virtues and attitudes that were listed above are relevant in a state with considerable cultural diversity, as well as in homogenous ones, but there are some additional attitudes that are particularly relevant in states where diversity is of major importance. Several of these have been proposed by T.A. Aleinikoff in the same article as mentioned above .

Reference

Appreciation of diversity. This means that citizens recognize and appreciate the existence of cultural groups, such as ethnic and religious ones, while also accepting that society can make demands on these groups and on their representatives.

Welcome and recognition. This is described as "policy of recognition" by TA Aleinikoff, and as follows: "To be sure, we ask allegiance of newcomers to the nation, but the nation must welcome them in a way that fosters their allegiance. Bourne wrote that integration and dedication to the American project could only come when no group felt that 'its cultural case is being prejudged. This demands a politics of recognition, not a politics of group-blindness."

It may be added that such recognition of other groups and their different worldviews should not be expected only from the majority group. The same expectation should be placed on each minority group in its approach to other minority groups and to the majority culture.

Freedom of assimilation and freedom of transition. This is described by TA Aleinikoff as follows under the heading 'permeability': *This principle insists on*

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both the reality of group boundaries and the ability to cross them. Crossing group boundaries may for example consist of reading news and studying literature from a cultural group other than one's own. It can also consist of making a bigger change, such as switching to another religion.

Rejection of all forms of supremacism. The term supremacism refers to notions that a particular group is superior to another one, or that it has special rights above other ones. It includes racism in both a biological and a cultural sense, as well as religionism and nationalism in the sense of doctrines that one's own religion or nation are superior to others.

Rejection of cultural separatism. Separatism refers here to the situation where a group isolates itself from the surrounding society, builds up negative attitudes to it, and uses these negative attitudes for defining its own identity. Separatism can occur both in religious and in ethno-religious groups, as well as in connection with political extremism.

Rejection of group egoism. Group egoism refers to the attitude where group members are expected to give special priority to the interests of their own group and its members when they are in a position of trust. Separatism can easily lead to group egoism.

7 Attitudes Related to Gender Diversity

Values that relate to gender and procreation are sometimes a cause of discord and of conflict: these values differ between different cultural or religious groups, and they are often held very strongly. From a paraliberal point of view there are two overriding considerations that should be used whenever they seem applicable, besides the assumption of secularity that is always present:
(1) to adopt the same attitudes in this context as in other, similar ones, for example the respect for the rights of individuals (section 4), and
(2) in view of the diversity of values in this context to apply the same attitudes as those that are related to cultural diversity (section 6).

8 Respect for, and defense of one's own country

Identification with one's own country. This includes solidarity, loyalty and perceived belonging. This is described by TA Aleinikoff in the following way under the heading 'allegiance':

Same ref

The central idea is that a person be committed to this country's continued flourishing and sees as part of that ongoing project. The allegiance, the common identification, need not be exclusive, but it must be paramount.

National anchoring. Every citizen is expected to know and understand their own country's conditions, culture, and history. This includes the ability to understand and communicate in the national language. Every citizen is also expected to be prepared to stand up for their own country if and when it is exposed to threats.

Active participation in government by the people. Popular government refers to the principle that all public power emanates from the people and is exercised by the state through the system laid down in the constitution. 'Active participation' means, among other things, participation in general elections and in opinion-forming activities on political issues.

Compliance with the law. This is based on the principle that laws are enacted by the people's government and that the respect for them is guaranteed in two ways: partly through spontaneous and voluntary compliance, and partly using a legal system based on police and courts.

The concept of compliance with the law includes respect for the legal property of other individuals and for the common property of society. Furthermore, it subsumes acceptance of the changes of ownership that society decides on, such as taxation.

Sense of co-responsibility for what one's country has done in the recent past. If one's own country has committed major wrong-doings against other countries or groups, then it has an obligation to compensate the victims to a reasonable extent. Moreover, each of its citizens should participate in reforms that will serve to avoid a repetition of the same kind of actions.

Popular acceptance of these attitudes is strongly dependent on whether the country's leadership act according to democratic principles.

What is said in this section also applies to state federations that one's own country has chosen to join through legitimate decisions.

9   Knowledge and insight on global issues

Knowledge about developments in the world as a whole, ie outside one's own country. This includes, for example, developments with respect to international conflicts, climate change, environmental degradation, global migration and global

public health, including the risk of pandemics. What is said above about attitudes that refer to knowledge and reason applies to these issues as well.

Sense of co-responsibility for dealing with these issues, ie those mentioned in the previous item.

Chapter 4

The Development of Maturity and Autonomy in an Individual

The concept of *maturity* was defined in Chapter 1 as a set of personal properties that are essential for the responsible exercise of the person's autonomy, for their participation in value communities, and for their access to the value culture in general. A young person's acquisition of values is one important part of their development of maturity and autonomy, together with their accumulation of experience and of confidence in , for example.

As a rule, the training of a person's maturity-related properties begins at a very early age, which means that it is governed by their parents and other family members. As the child gradually becomes less dependent on their parents, they will increasingly be influenced by peers, teachers, and leaders in extracurricular activities, and their values and their autonomy will develop accordingly. From the paraliberal point of view, it is natural that the state should exercise some supervision of these processes by setting overall goals and policies, for the schools, in particular. The state may also need to react if a particular community there organizes their children's lives in a way whereby they adopt attitudes that are contrary to foundational values.

The character and the extent of the state's oversight in these matters is a sensitive issue which may give rise to controversies, in particular since it is an area where society-founding values and personal values tend to meet and overlap. This shall be the topic of the present chapter. Maturity and autonomy will be discussed under separate headings although they are of course closely related.

On the Nature of Moral and Mature Decision-making

Our definition of maturity was stated in Chapter 2 as comprising the following groups of abilities:

Human abilities, such as the ability for *empathy,* for *solidarity* in a group, and for *commitment* to the well-being of humanity in all its parts.

Social abilities, such as respect for the *dignity* of others, active participation in *communal activities,* and *respect for the law.*

Cognitive abilities, such as *open-mindedness* towards new facts and opinions, *good judgement, common sense,* and the ability to think and act *rationally* .

Open-mindedness seems to occur spontaneously even in very small children, and empathy can also be observed there, although not consistently. Both those abilities can be reinforced with good feedback from the environment, whereas the other abilities in the list basically have to be learnt at the appropriate age.

These human and social abilities are manifested by actions, and therefore they are essentially the ability to make the right choice of action in each particular situation. In his book 'Blink', Malcolm Gladwell describes how human decision-making (in the sense of making a choice between a few alternatives) is often performed by selecting a few factors that are particularly relevant for the situation at hand, from a large number of other variables or conditions. Once these factors have been selected, the choice of decision will be in some sense straight-forward. It can be understood in computational terms as the use of a simple decision-tree , or as a table lookup.

Although Gladwell describes how his model can explain the behavior of adults, it is natural to use it as a model for the maturity-related abilities of children as well. His model suggests how these abilities can be trained by reinforcement learning through exposure to a large number of concrete situations.

When it comes to decisions in situations that require a moral stance, it is tempting to think that this must be a cognitive activity where moral rules are applied. However, Jonathan Haidt argues that, on the contrary, moral choices are mostly done by 'intuition'. Rather than viewing this intuition as a black box, one may consider using Gladwell's model for a concrete understanding of 'intuition'. Such an approach would be in line with the idea that people have a 'moral compass' that can guide them to the right decision, even in situations that are bewilderingly complex.

On the other hand, it is certainly not possible to reduce all kinds of moral decision-making to 'intuition', since considerations on the cognitive level are also used frequently. These may sometimes be viewed as a way of rationalizing a decision that one has already made, but it may also be viewed as a way of double-checking the validity of a preliminary decision that has been made using 'intuition'. Furthermore, it is easy to see how an 'intuitive' process may sometimes fail to discriminate between two or more alternatives, so that the moral decision has to be referred to the cognitive level.

The cognitive representation of moral rules and moral choices serves other important purposes as well, namely, for post-hoc thinking about one's own past actions, and for communication about the morality of concrete actions in the past or in future, and even for a discussion about the validity or the revision of some moral rules. This is the kind of discussion that should occur in value communities.

Chapter 5

Premises with Respect to Individual Autonomy

The previous chapters have addressed values and autonomy from the perspective of the individual, which is one important aspect of liberalism. It has been the natural first step, before addressing the political aspect of the paraliberal view, ie its view of governance and of the state. The paraliberal view of the state is strongly related to its view of individual autonomy.

In order to state these relationships as clearly as possible, it will be helpful to restate the major points of the previous chapters in a concise way. Each of these points will be written as a *premise,* as in the following list.

Premises that Summarize Chapters 1 and 2

Premise 1. The paraliberal view is based on a belief in the individual's ability for autonomy, that is, for *independent thinking and acting using knowledge and reason, and guided by responsible values and guidelines.*

Premise 2. While the individual's autonomy is based on their values, which they can choose freely, *each society has a strong interest in having a vital value culture among its members.* This means that there should be an open and lively debate on values, a debate where differing opinions can be expressed and confronted, but always be treated with mutual respect.

Premise 3. Every state has a need for a set of *society-founding values* that are accepted by the majority of its citizens, and which consists of values that are important for the state and society to function well. One or a few of these may be designated as *cardinal values* in order to express their fundamental status.

Premise 4 It is a goal for human society that *each individual shall be able to develop their abilities as far as possible, and in particular their capacity for autonomy.* This is considered as a cardinal value.

This premise expresses an expectation that all individuals shall have adopted this cardinal value, and is also a guideline for the organization of society. It is expected that both the individual and society shall contribute to the stated goal.

Premise 5 It is important that *each individual shall have an* open mind, *both towards other people and towards new knowledge and new opinions. Openness to others also includes* empathy. This principle is in the interest of both the individual and the society where she lives. Openness and empathy are prerequisites for the

purpose stated in premise 3, as well as for the deliberations in a value community. In that context, it is especially important that the members of a value community do not merely have an open mind towards its other members, but also towards facts, opinions and values that arrive from the outside.

Premise 6 The well-being of an individual and a society depends very much on *the existence of solidarity and trust between the individuals there.* People's ability for responsible values and guidelines is often exercised on an individual level and in concrete situations, but it contributes also to trust and solidarity within larger or smaller groups. On a national level, both trust and solidarity are important in themselves, but also since these characteristics interact with the common values in a mutually reinforcing way.

Premise 7 In every state, its *society-founding values should include a principled position in favor of civil liberties and rights, ie the freedoms, rights, and also obligations that shall apply to every citizen of a society.* The term *civil rights* is preferred here, instead of human rights, since they largely concern rights that are to be guaranteed by a state, and which do not come about by themselves.

Well-known and widely accepted lists of human rights belong under this premise. However, the paraliberal view is not committed to any particular list of civil rights since the view of these may differ due to local conditions, and they may also develop over time.

There are some dependencies between these premises. For example, premise 3 can be seen as consequence of premise 2 – not in the sense of a logical consequence, but in the sense that premise 3 states a natural and desirable outcome of the value culture that is mentioned in premise 2. Similarly, the open-mindedness mentioned in premise 5 can contribute greatly to the solidarity and trust that are mentioned in premise 6.

In a similar way, the following additional premise is introduced in support of the value culture that is mentioned in premise 2:

Premise 8. Activities that have as their goal to achieve a rational change of attitudes and values in a society are to be considered a opinion-forming attitudes which may be protected according to premise 7. *Therefore, they shall have the same freedoms as other opinion formation activities, and they shall also be subject to the same restrictions.*

About Premises in the Remaining Chapters

While the previous chapters have addressed the view of the individual according to the paraliberal view, the chapters that are to follow shall address its view of governance and of government. This point of view will be expressed as a suite of 28 additional premises, many of which will be quite uncontroversial for a reader with a Western background. However, some other premises will be non-obvious, and maybe surprising. The reason for including the 'obvious' premises is that in this way we provide a view of governance that has some coherence, and not merely a few proposals for a number of separate issues.

Chapter 1 stated two intended purposes for the present book. One was to contribute to the discussion about liberalism, in view of its present challenges. The other goal was that this text should be useful in a dialog with, for example, advocates of liberal interpretations of Islam. The presentation of the paraliberal view as a coherent, value-based view of both the individual and of society is needed for achieving the second purpose, and in order to have answers to the variety of issues that may be raised by our counterparts in such a dialog.

Chapter 6

The Souverainty and Autonomy of States

While the autonomy of the individual is one of the major considerations for liberalism, the other one is how a human society can best be organized in order to promote the common good. This will be the topic of the present chapter and the following ones. The paraliberal position will be expressed in terms of a number of premises that express guidelines for a paraliberal state, guidelines for its organization, its behavior towards its own citizens, and its behavior towards other liberal states.

The Cardinal Value of Global Sustainability

Before proceeding to the paraliberal view of governance and of the state, we need to introduce one more premise which states a second cardinal value in the paraliberal view, since this additional cardinal value is essential for the purpose of the paraliberal state. It is as follows.

Premise 9. *It is an overarching goal for mankind that it shall nurture and preserve all the unique properties of the planet Earth, for the benefit of all its inhabitants, both now and in the future.*

The use of the word 'mankind' entails that both individuals, states, corporations, etc. ought to adopt this overarching goal and contribute towards it to the best of their ability. This issue has not been considered in political philosophy which is natural since the problem of permanent damage to the planet has been recognized until in recent years.

Since political liberalism is not universally accepted, it will be appropriate to account for how a paraliberal state should relate to states that subscribe to different ideologies. We shall therefore need a few premises that define our assumptions about the character of non-liberal states. These premises will merely be used to provide the context for guidelines about appropriate behaviors towards states of that kind, or towards states of all kind.

The Purpose of the State and the Paraliberal State

The existential question for an individual, "what is the purpose of my life?", can be compared with a similar question for a state or a nation: "what purpose does it serve?". The following alternative answers for the latter question are well-known and often heard:

- The purpose of the state is to maintain order, to protect its citizens against threats and to guarantee their civil rights, and to provide services for their welfare.

- The nation connects past, present and future generations. It acts as a guardian of their cultural traditions, and therefore it is important for the quality of life of the current generation, but this also obliges the current generation to preserve the nation for the benefit of future generations.

- Realistically, and especially over a longer timespan, nations are subject to the law of survival of the fittest. Therefore, although the first two roles are important for a nation-state, the first priority of a nation-state must be to be strong in a variety of ways. In its pursuit of strength it shall strive to dominate other states, in order not to be dominated by them later on.

The paraliberal position that was stated in Chapter 1 suggests that the first one of these alternatives should be expanded as follows:

Premise 10. *The purpose of a paraliberal state is to maintain order, to protect its citizens against threats, to guarantee their civil rights, to provide services for their welfare, and to implement the paraliberal views of individual autonomy and global sustainability.*

The paraliberal views that are mentioned here have been expressed in Premises 1 through 9. However, in all cases the value community that is formed by the citizens shall have the power to define or amend these principles for use in the state in question.

This statement implies that one of the tasks for a paraliberal state is to protect the proper functioning of the value community that is formed by the citizens. Another one of its tasks is obviously to organize the system of governance, but this is an instrumental requirement rather than a goal in itself.

In order to discuss such alternative views of the purpose of the state, it is natural to use an analogy between individuals and states. Just as most individuals embrace a set of values, including some values that describe how they view their purpose in life, the same holds arguably for states. In particular, the alternative purposes of states that were shown above may be seen as the bases for corresponding value collections for states.

Reliable States and the Rule-Based International Order

The following premise expresses the principle of sovereignty of states which is taken for granted in almost all contexts. It is stated here so that it can be used as

a reference in discussions about exceptions to it, and about alternative systems of governance.

Premise 11. *Humanity is organized in terms of sovereign states, each of which having its own territory, and each also having its own population that in principle resides in that territory. States are not supposed to intervene in the territory or in the internal affairs of other sovereign states.*

This is known as the Westphalian system since it was arguably established by the peace accord in Westphalia that concluded the thirty years' war, in 1648, and whereby the supranational 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation' lost much of its political importance.

From the paraliberal point of view, the Westphalian system is defended as the only realistic framework within which humanity can work towards our two cardinal goals. In other words, this premise explicitly rejects the idea of a 'world government' of some kind, as a solution to the global problems of the world of today. Such ideas are advanced by some liberal ideologues, but promoting them for the sustainability goal must be considered as a distraction and a dead end.

The paraliberal view adopts this premise, but observes that it must be combined with a number of constraints that sovereign states impose on their own behaviors. A world of sovereign states that did not apply constraints may well descend into violence. The necessary constraints are presently defined by the *rule-based international order,* which is described as follows in the Wikipedia:

Reference

In international relations, the liberal international order (LIO), also known as the rules-based international order (RBIO) or the rules-based order (RBO) describes a set of global, rule-based, structured relationships based on political liberalism, economic liberalism and liberal internationalism since the late 1940s. More specifically, it entails international cooperation through multilateral institutions (like the United Nations, World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund) and is constituted by human equality (freedom, rule of law and human rights), open markets, security cooperation, promotion of liberal democracy, and monetary cooperation. The order was established in the aftermath of World War II, led in large part by the United States.

This rule-based international order is being questioned by some non-liberal states, such as Russia and China. It is argued by some that the practical consequences of the RBIO are not fair, and that its rules are applied selectively. It is also argued that a "multi-polar" arrangement would be more appropriate and fair. A few great powers would then take the right to dominate their neighboring states. Such a multi-polar international order would of course be incompatible with Premise 11.

The concept of a *trustworthy state* is introduced in order to designate states that need not be paraliberal, but which a paraliberal state can anyway relate to in a reasonable way.

Premise 12. *A sovereign state is said to be* trustworthy *if it respects the rule-based international order and, in particular, the principle of* pacta sunt servanda, *meaning that it upholds the agreements that it has made.*

When the following chapters touch on the question of how a paraliberal state shall relate to states that do not share the paraliberal view, it will be natural to focus on the relations to states that are reliable in this sense.

Chapter 7

The Paraliberal Nation-State

At the beginning of Chapter 1, we identified how a paraliberal state must avoid two dangers at the same time: it can not remain passive in all matters that concern values and morality, but it can also not infringe on the freedoms of citizens by being too strongly proactive in such matters. The present chapter shall introduce a number of premises for the governance of a paraliberal state.

Basic Premises

Premise 13. *A state is said to be a* paraliberal state *if it is trustworthy (in the sense defined above), if its behavior is guided by a body of knowledge and a set of values that represent a consensus among its citizens, and if its values agree with the paraliberal view, at least in general terms.*

In particular, paraliberal state must have adopted the cardinal values of human autonomy and global sustainability, as well as premises 1 through 10 of the paraliberal view. Therefore, it shall strive to achieve the autonomy goal for all individuals in its own population (Premise 4), and it shall cooperate with other states towards the sustainability goal (Premise 10). Moreover, it follows:

Premise 14. *A paraliberal state and its citizens must treat other trustworthy states and their citizens with respect and generosity.*

This follows at once since global sustainability can only be achieved by good cooperation between all states. Bad relations between states, or between their populations would be detrimental to that cooperation. Besides, there are of course many other good reasons for good relations between states and between peoples.

Moreover, it is our conviction that a paraliberal state is in fact possible:

Premise 15. *If a strong majority of the citizens in a sovereign state are autonomous individuals with paraliberal views, then it is possible for them to establish or to maintain a paraliberal state.*

A Modified Concept of 'Nation'

While the paraliberal state must promote its society-founding and state-founding values, it must also have a correct and constructive relationship to those citizens that do not share those values. For the discussion of such situations, it shall be important to have an adequate terminology for describing them.

The following concepts and terms will be used here, and they will be applied to sovereign states in general – not merely to paraliberal states. Given that a sovereign state has its own territory and its population (Premise 11), we add that the state also has its own *citizenship* which overlaps strongly with the population. This means that most members of the population are also included in the citizenship, and vice versa. Issues having to do with those members of the population that do not have citizenship will be addressed in the context of migration, in Chapter 9, and here we shall address how some citizens will not share those values that the state has established as being foundational.

For this purpose, we define the *nation* of a state as consisting of those citizens that share the state's foundational values, provided that such exist and that they are embraced by a large majority of the citizens. In the case of a paraliberal state, they consist of its society-founding values and its state-founding values. If those conditions are not satisfied then the state in question does not have a nation. A state that has a nation is called a *nation-state.* At the same time, we define the *folk* of a state as consisting of those citizens that identify with their own country, especially on an emotional level, with feelings such as enthusiasm, pride, nostalgia, defensiveness, or solidarity, for example. This is in line with the definition of the word 'folk' in the Merriam-Webster dictionary where one of the alternative meanings is "a group of people forming a tribe or nation".

This distinction between nation and folk is analogous to the well-known distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, although they shall not be seen as philosophical alternatives here, and instead, as two aspects of reality. It is sometimes argued that civic nationalism is too 'thin' and that it will not work in practice. Here we propose that the folk and the nation should be seen as strongly overlapping collections – most members of one are also members of the other – and that this situation is both common and desirable. At the same time, identifying these as two different concepts prepares the way for a constructive discussion about how a state shall best relate to those citizens that do not identify with one or the other of them.

These concepts are imperfect descriptions of reality, one must admit, since membership in either of these groups will always be a matter of degree, rather than a simple choice between in and out. However, they shall be adequate for the present purpose.

A nation-state is said to be *liberal* and *democratic* if it has liberal society-

founding values, and if it also has state-founding values that are in line with liberal democracy.

Characteristic Properties of a Paraliberal Nation-state

The following premises summarize what we should expect a paraliberal nation-state to be like. Most of the premises mention the words "paraliberal nation-state" but they are understood even in those premises where they do not occur.

Premise 16. *In a paraliberal nation-state, all citizens that embrace its foundational values are regarded as members of the nation, and as equals in that respect. No one may, against their will and without valid reason, be excluded from the value community that the nation is, by definition. At the same time, the state must accept that there may be citizens that make it known, explicitly and by their free choice, that they do not accept the foundational values. They are nevertheless full citizens, but their choice is a valid reason why they should not be considered part of the nation.*

Premise 17. *A paraliberal nation-state shall apply representative democracy, which means that all important decisions are made by individuals and assemblies that have been appointed by universal and equal suffrage in secret ballots. The right to vote shall also include citizens that have chosen not to be part of the nation.*

The conceptual distinction between the state with its citizens, and the nation with its members, is proposed as a way of handling such situations in a way that is transparent, and respectful to all those concerned. The premises in the next section serve the same purpose.

Premise 18. *A paraliberal nation-state state must be based on two interdependent resources, namely its foundational values and its legislation, both of which are supported by the major part of the citizenship. The first purpose of both shall be to protect the integrity, autonomy and civic rights of all individuals in the population, as well as to support efforts towards the sustainability goal.*

The foundational values must be based on a value community, and the laws and the value community are interdependent: laws must be based on citizens' common values to be legitimate, but law enforcement can not be guaranteed solely by the police and the judicial system. Citizens' common values are also a necessary condition for the laws to be applied in practice.

Premise 19. *In a paraliberal nation-state, the state's responsibility to guarantee the civic rights of its population is exercised not only through its laws and legal systems, but also in several other ways. These include preventive measures that reduce the risk of violations of civic rights, as well as the state's responsibility for defense against external threats, for maintaining an infrastructure whereby every citizen can find their livelihood, for creating insurance systems of various kinds, and for establishing safety nets for citizens with special needs. They may also include an authority for the redistribution of property and of income in order to ensure that the rights of all citizens are respected, and to counteract socially harmful inequalities in these respects.*

The Self-Protection of the Paraliberal Nation-State

This section addresses the state's responsibility to protect the nation's functioning and long-term survival, as well as some consequences for its relations to other states.

Premise 20. *A paraliberal nation-state is in itself a cultural expression that has an intrinsic value, and one of the tasks of a nation-state is that it must act to ensure its own survival and continued function as a liberal democracy. At the same time, it must respect and support other states in their efforts to ensure their survival, as well as their continued function insofar as this is consistent with the principles of civic rights.*

This means that the nation-state must be able to defend itself against forces that threaten to dismatnle it, for example by destroying the conditions for the national value community, or for the society-founding values.

The paraliberal nation-state's actions in this respect must, of course, be performed within the bounds of its foundational values, and exceptions to this may only take place under truly extraordinary circumstances. Notice, in this context. that the survival of the nation is not placed on the level of a cardinal goal. Nations are considered as an effective way of working towards the cardinal goals, but no nation is a cardinal goal in itself, in our view.

Premise 21. *A paraliberal nation-state has three major resources that are necessary for its long-term existence, namely its territory, its national language(s), and its value community. The care of these resources must therefore be a high priority. In order for the State to carry out its tasks, it must have control over its territory and its borders, and over the legislation that must apply within its territory.*

Usually there will be just one national language, but exceptions to this do occur.

Premise 22. *Open exchange of information and open debate are important preconditions for a state to function well. They are needed for bringing attention to situations where civic rights or other foundational values are not being respected, and for engaging the popular opinion in such cases. They are also needed as carriers of the discussion of foundational values that should occur in the national value culture.*

One necessary prerequisite for such openness is a freedom of information so that problems can not be hidden and so that adequate measures can be identified. A free press and free, non-polluted IT-based media are other prerequisites whereby information can be disseminated and discussed. (Media are said to be polluted if they contain overwhelming amounts of misleading or irrelevant material).

Premise 23. *Since a paraliberal nation-state needs to have an effective agreement on its own foundational values, it is an important task for the state to organize consultations where these values are discussed and agreed, and where they can also be revised if necessary.*

Premise 24. *As a consequence of Premise 16, the paraliberal nation-state must ensure that its young generation learns both the principles of liberal democracy and the prevailing foundational values, and it must strive for their adoption of these values.*

Many parties must contribute to this: parents, schools, civil society, cultural workers, the media, as well as other commercial actors. This is important in itself, but it is also part of the concern that liberal democracy shall be sustainable in the long term.

   The goal that the youth shall 'adopt' these values shall not be taken to mean that they are required to adopt them uncritically. Since the values are subject to change, each new generation has the opportunity to revise them and to improve them.

Premise 25. *In the case of citizens that have made it clear that they do not share the foundational values, it can normally be assumed that such persons constitute a small minority, and that the foundational values will prevail. However, should the state, by some course of events, make decisions that would permanently change its character drastically away from these values, then the nation and its members*

have a moral right and obligation to intervene, and to ensure that the state returns to its previous values.

The nation and its members would probably do that anyway in such a situation, regardless of what the foundational values says, but this may be useful as a statement of intent.

From Premise 16 it follows that a liberal nation-state shall respect other states with respect to their activities according to premises 17 to 21.

Promotion and use of the state's foundational values

Since the foundational values is essential for a paraliberal nation-state, such a state has a need to promote them. At the same time, such promotion activities must alway be conducted within the framework of the foundational values, since otherwise they may easily be counterproductive.

Promotional measures

Since it is usually difficult to change the attitudes of adults, it is quite important to engage the young generation for the state's foundational values. It is also important to counteract the dissemination of contrary values, which may occur in some congregational schools, for example.

Youth activities of various kinds are also important from this perspective. It is important that organizations for youth activities have a clear understanding of the foundational values, and that they assist in propagating them.

Another important situation is for immigrants that have just arrived in a new country. In that situation most people are particularly receptive to new facts and ideas. Therefore it is important that they should be engaged in discussions about values, and in local value communities as soon as possible after their arrival.

Limitations on promotion and usage

There are evident reasons why the state and society should support society-based values and contribute to their acceptance. At the same time, there must also be clear limits to the state's action in this respect, so that critical discussion of the prevailing attitudes are is also made possible. It may therefore be preferable that most of the discussion about values is conducted in the civil society of non-governmental organizations, and that the actions of the state are limited to asserting the most basic principles.

The promotion of the foundational values must always be weighed against other urgent wishes, and in particular against the importance of open information

and open debate. This is an important issue and it justifies the following premise.

Premise 26. *Universities and other academic environments must not have rules that require their employees and students to limit themselves to the foundational values in their choice of teaching materials or in their research. In such environments, it must be possible to advocate positions that run counter to the foundational values, in order to debate them and review them.*

However, even in academic settings, it should be possible to have rules to the effect that when material that is contrary to the foundational values is published, it must be accompanied by an appendix containing contrary arguments and facts.

Chapter 8

Diversity in a Paraliberal Nation-State

In the paraliberal view, it is important for a state to distinguish between its foundational values and other values that occur there, since they give rise to quite different issues. It is also important that no religious doctrines or beliefs are included among the foundational values, which means that a paraliberal state must be a secular one. The following premises express this.

The Secularity of the Paraliberal Nation-State

The following premises express in a concise way that the paraliberal state shall be a secular one, and that it shall allow full religious freedom within the bounds of its foundational values.

Premise 27. *Value statements that are specific to one or more religions or alternative philosophical positions shall not be included among the foundational values of a paraliberal state.*

Premise 28. *If a value community in a paraliberal state embraces values that are compatible with the state's foundational values, then the state shall respect the integrity of this value community and not interfere with its beliefs.*

Premise 29. *The state-founding values shall include a rule that contributions to the common discourse in the state's affairs shall adhere to the principle of public reason.*

The term 'public reason' was defined in Chapter 3, Section 5. Premise 27 is a consequence of the principle of public reason, therefore.

There is also a related question of how the paraliberal state shall relate to individuals and groups that do not accept its foundational values. The remainder of this chapter shall address this topic.

Citizens that do not accept the foundational values

A paraliberal state shall have a clear policy towards citizens, or groups of citizens that explicitly distance themselves from the nation's foundational values or the nation as a value community. This may apply, in particular, for citizens that claim that a particular foreign system of values is inherently superior and that it takes precedence over the national one. Such a position may be taken for religious

reasons, but it may also occur with reference to customs and traditions in an ethnic group.

The state's approach to such situations must first of all be that the law applies equally to everyone, and without any exception to an(setq *latexcodes* nil) individual's opinions or conscience. On the other hand, of course, the laws should be designed so that they do not create conflicts of conscience unnecessarily.

In addition, the policy of the state should include the following:

Premise 30. *The attitudes that were described in Section 8 of Chapter 3 (Respect for, and defense of one's own country) are expected from all citizens, including those that do not accept the foundational values as a whole. This includes e.g. the attitude of National anchoring. The state has a mission to promote these attitudes.*

In other words, the state should express a clear expectation on those citizens that have different values of this kind, namely, that they should familiarize themselves with the values that apply in the society and try to understand their background and character, even though they do not accept them. The state's actions in this respect should not strive to change the values of the persons concerned, but every citizen should be considered to have an obligation to understand society's common values. At the same time, society respects the citizen for his choice of values.

Political separatism

Special problems arise if groups are formed whose members jointly distance themselves from the general value community and the society-founding values, instead forming their own value community that is in opposition to the surrounding society. Such an inclination will be referred to as *separatism,* and it may lead to the emergence of parallel societies

References The problem of such separatims has been raised in several countries, including in the new French legislation in 2021 on measures against separatims . Political separatism is undesirable from the point of view of paraliberalism. This justifies the following separate premise concerning measures against such separatism:

Premise 31. *Separatism should be seen as a possible threat to a democratic society. It shall therefore be treated with caution from the point of view of the state, and lead to clear countermeasures if necessary.*

One such measure may be to establish a possibility for a *preaching ban,* ie to ban specific moral teachers from talking to large audiences. This is one example of discouraging the promotion of values that are contrary to liberal democracy or to the current foundational values. A preaching ban is of course a restriction

on the freedom of expression, so it should only be applied when there are strong reasons for it.

Normative value communities

In the following, a distinction is made between norms and guidelines, where norms may refer to values that apply in a group and which the group considers to be binding, so that it carries out sanctions against a group member who does not comply with the norm. Guidelines refer to common values in a group that does not react to it the way. A community of values that has common norms will therefore be called *normative.* In normative value communities, it is common for one or more to occur *norm-setter,* that is, members of the community whose role is to tighten up Community standards among its members, both general and public principles and by taking a position in specific cases. Because the norms are a kind of values, a norm-setter is usually also a moral teacher.

Norms are common and rarely cause any measures by the state, but some delimitations still need to be made. These are expressed with the following premises.

Premise 32. *If a norm in a normative community of values contradicts the laws of the state or the foundational values, it is the latter that will apply. No one has the right to invoke e.g. freedom, conscience, freedom of religion or membership of a normative community to assert a right to deviate from applicable law that has been decided in a democratic way.*

A possible objection against this premise may be that it is redundant since no one has the right to call on people to break the laws anyway. However, the reason for adopting premise 32 is to single out moral teachers as having a special responsibility in this regard, and also to extend the principle to to also apply to calls to violate current societal values.

Premise 33. *A norm-setter or moral teacher in a normative community is expected to adopt the attitude of public reason, and to contribute to its use by others. They do not have the right to urge members of their community to reject the foundational values that apply in the nation state where they are staying.*

Premise 33 applies specifically for norm-setters; its second sentence may well be represented as a law, whereas its first sentence has the character of a society-founding value. Moreover, the policy of public reason should not only apply to norm-setters. The adoption of this policy is included among the proposed society-founding values in Chapter 3, Section 5.

Conflicting values in the context of diversity

Cultural diversity exists when it exists within a state important differences between large groups within the population, and with respect to ethnicity or religion for example. Such diversity is the normal situation in many parts of the world, both now and in the past, while maintaining cultural homogeneity (which is thus the opposite of diversity) is seen by many in the rich world as such natural and desirable state of a state. That leads to even a moderate increase in cultural diversity can be perceived as a problem, and(setq *latexcodes* nil) it can also be blamed for problems that actually have other causes.

Cultural diversity is often associated with significant differences between the values in the culturally different population groups, which means(ebo: debate deb-345) that the paraliberal view should have something to say about it. In addition, migration is often the most important explanation for an increased cultural diversity, and migration in turn is often due to a deterioration in environment, sometimes also due to climate change. This is another important aspect of the subject of cultural diversity.

In this context, two important and related issues arise from the paraliberal point of view, namely: (1) How should a value-liberal state and its majority population act in terms of cultural diversity, and (2) what can be said about the appropriate behavior of and towards cultural minorities in such State?

A first answer to question (1) is given by the section on normative value communities earlier in this chapter. Question (2) is addressed in the section entitled "Attitudes related to cultural diversity" in Chapter 3.

Chapter 9

Reception of Migrants in a Paraliberal Nation-State

In Chapter 6 we defined *autonomous states* as those sovereign states that have adopted the two cardinal goals as their own, along with an expectation that almost all states shall share these goals. The sustainability goal is so urgent and important that states must put their competition and their ideological differences aside in order to cooperate towards it. Then, in Chapter 7, we defined the concepts of *nation-states* and *liberal nation-states* in terms of their foundational values.

The present chapter shall address the proposed values for liberal nation-states, that is, guidelines for their behavior towards other autonomous states in general, and to their citizens. This topic includes their behaviors towards states that are not nation-states at all, and towards non-liberal nation states. For this purpose there is a need for a few assumptions about how these kinds of states differ, in their behaviors, from liberal nation-states. The premises in Chapters 6 and 7 will serve as such assumptions in the present chapter.

Residents and Migrants in the Population of a State

The idea that every state has "its own population" which resides in "its own territory" is a convenient one, but, in order to be useful, it must be complemented by an account of realities that are not mentioned in that model. For this purpose we shall distinguish between *residents* and *migrants,* where residents are all those that the state recognizes as having full rights for living in the state's territory, and migrants are everyone else in the population, including tourists and the 'paperless' as well as the so-called 'illegal aliens', for example. 'Resident non-citizens', who have full rights of stay but no voting rights, will be considered as residents for this purpose.

Such a partitioning of the population (that is, all the individuals that are actually present in the territory) describes the reality of today. In practice there are several additional categories and sub-categories. In order to reason about the rights and duties of citizens and non-citizens, and about the role of the state in this context, it is necessary to distinguish categories such as these, even if one does not like to assign people into categories.

As stated before, we prefer to use the term 'civil rights' rather than 'human rights' since most of the proposed human rights are such that they can only be guaranteed or delivered by a state.

Since the definition of who is a resident is based on decisions by the state, and since the extent of civil rights is also decided by the state, it is natural that there can be some civil rights that residents have and that migrants do not have. The strongest restriction occurs if and when some migrants do not have the right to be

in the country at all, or that they are only allowed to stay for a certain limited time, such as three months. This means that if they overstay, or stay at all, they will face legal consequences. Would-be migrants may even be denied the right of entering the country, so that they may be stuck at the border, often with deplorable results.

Other migrants that enjoy a better welcome may just be deprived of some freedoms, such as the freedom of personal commerce. With restrictions on personal commerce, migrants may for example not have the right to own land or other real estate in the country at hand, or they may not have the right to own a company, or to have a position of high responsibility there.

Besides the freedom of personal commerce, there may also be restrictions on other freedoms, such as the freedom of movement within the country.

There is a variety of reasons why a state may decide to limit some people's freedoms in these ways, even for rights that are held by its residents. There may be practical reasons, for example as a guarantee that taxes will be paid properly, and that a responsible person is in place if there are substantial problems in an enterpriese or with respect to a piece of land.

In the world of today, there is a rapid increase in the number of migrants, and many states consider that they must impose restrictions on migrants in their territory, for at least two reasons: to reduce the perceived adverse effects of the migrant population on the residents or on the state itself, and also in order to make it less attractive for additional migrants to come to the country at all.

The Civil Rights of Migrants

Premises with respect to restrictions on the rights for migrants. They approximate current situations in the field, and they are not put forward as recommended or desirable. Furthermore, they are expressed in terms of the well-known distinction between negative rights and positive rights, which may be understood as 'rights to do or retain something' and 'rights to obtain something', respectively

Premise 34. *All residents and migrants that are present in a state's territory shall be able to exercise their negative civil rights, and all the residents shall be able to exercise their positive civil rights as well. The state has the right to make some restrictions on the positive rights for those citizens that have chosen not to be part of the nation.*

Premise 35. *Stateless persons that are present in the territory of a state shall be given reasonable access to the positive civil rights that are enjoyed by the citizens. The same shall apply for citizens of other states when those states are not able or willing to guarantee the civil rights of these nationals. However, the state always has a moral right to set limits on the extent to which it accepts to meet*

such needs.

Premise 36. *When processing applications for citizenship, or requests for entry by migrants, the nation-state has a moral right and obligation to ensure that its basic resources, or its ability to perform its basic functions, are not endangered in the short term or in the long term.*

The Moral Aspect of Separate Rules for Migrants

Having separate rules for residents and migrants may well be called discrimination, although one usually does not use that word when it is the state that has made these rules. The question remains anyway whether it is morally defensible to make and enforce such discriminatory rules.

The principle of non-discrimination is held in high esteem, which is confirmed by it being included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since this convention has been ratified by most United Nations members, it seems that a valid moral defense for discrimination of migrants by a state must rely on very high-level principles. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether such discrimination can be motivated by the cardinal goals of human autonomy or of global sustainability.

This is not an easy question to answer and it would merit a separate article. As an example of a possible line of arguments, it may be argued that equal treatment for residents and migrants would lead to excessive migration into rich and industrialized countries, which in turn would cause great suffering for all parts of the world, and that the only realistic strategy for achieving a sustainable development for all lies in further development of technology and agriculture. This argument is not accepted by everyone.

For the present purpose, the starting point must be, therefore, that it is acceptable for states to establish different rules for residents and for migrants, with a realization that this is only acceptable because some higher goal trumps the principle of non-discrimination. In other words, discrimination of migrants is a necessary evil, which means that it should be made to cause as little harm as possible.

From that point on, the topic of 'migration and morality' may be viewed regarding what does morality require from a migrant, a resident, and a state that receives migrants. With more detail, what does morality require from the migrant that wishes to enter the country, the migrant that has just entered, and the migrant that has stayed in the country for a long time already?

For some of these stakeholders, one significant factor may be what are the reasons why the migrants in question have left their home countries in the first place. The following reasons are often quoted:
– Lack of natural resources in the home country (starvation, drought, etc.)

– Environmental problems in the home country (e.g. pollution)
– Oppression by the government there
– A violent environment for non-governmental reasons (war, civil war)
– Search for opportunities and a better life

The first four reasons are necessity-related; the last one is opportunity-related. Moreover, the first two can be called nature-caused whereas number three and four are society-caused. The designation 'nature-caused' refers only to the immediate reasons for migration, since the problems there may well have been caused by human activity or by the mere size of the population, either in the same country, or outside its borders.

The last one of these reasons, 'to search for opportunities and a better life', is often regarded as being of lower priority when these matters are discussed. On the other hand, one may also argue that the search for a better life coincides often with a search for individual autonomy, inasmuch as dire poverty may definitely prevent a person from developing their capacity for autonomy. If the goal of individual autonomy is taken seriously, according to Premises 1 and 4, then it must be considered as a human duty to do what can be done so as to facilitate for this group of migrants as well. In fact, since migration is sometimes caused by climate change and other environmental change, it is at the heart of major clashes between the two cardinal goals.

In summary, the problem of morality in the context of migration is a very complex one, and a problem that requires compromises between important values that can not be fully achieved together.

Chapter 10

Citizenship, Voting Rights, and Foundational Values

Premise 17 in Chapter 7 set out the important role of democracy as follows:

Premise 17. *The liberal nation-state shall apply representative democracy, which means that all important decisions are made by individuals and assemblies that have been appointed by universal and equal suffrage in secret ballots. The right to vote shall also include citizens who have chosen not to be part of the nation.*

'Secret' elections thus refer to elections where the secrecy of the vote is strictly guaranteed. The concept 'General elections' are not as simple as it may first seem. The question of who should have the right to vote is also linked to the question of what is required to obtain citizenship, which is something that is often discussed. This chapter discusses these issues, followed by the question of how the drafting of the foundational values can best be done in a nation.

Criteria for citizenship and voting rights

One can in principle distinguish three pure criteria for citizenship. One possibility is that citizenship is obtained through inheritance, for example that one inherits from the father citizenship unless there are special reasons. One territorial definition is another opportunity, where those who are permanently residing in the territory of a particular State shall counted as its citizens. The third possibility is to connect citizenship cultural affiliation, so that everyone who is sufficiently 'anchored' in a state should be eligible for citizenship there. This third opportunity provides greater opportunity to assessments than the first two, which in itself can be a disadvantage.

In practice, Sweden, like many other countries, applies a combination of the former and the third criterion. It gives room for a certain arbitrariness, but has nevertheless evolved to an established practice. At the same time, there is a recurring discussion about what should be apply, for example if knowledge of the country's national language is to be a requirement for citizenship, or whether knowledge of, and understanding of, the country's social system is required. Such requirements are then justified by the fact that citizenship gives the right to vote in general elections, and those requirements are seen as prerequisites for a voter to be able to make an informed decision.

The issues of voting rights and the right to citizenship are thus linked. In the following, these issues are discussed unconditionally, ie as far as possible without ties to current rules and practices, and mainly based on the paraliberal view. This

will also provide an explanation for the last sentence of Premise 15, as otherwise may seem unjustified.

The view of the nation state as a community of values with regard to the founding of society values are fundamental to value liberalism, and it has been described in the previous ones chapter. With this in mind, it is natural to see these values as it is natural frame of reference for policy and policy decisions, and therefore also for the general elections. On the other hand, it would not be acceptable to restrict the right to vote Those who claim to embrace these values, especially as it is difficult to know what one is person really thinks. A better solution is instead to assume *knowledge of* the societal values and how they are used in practice, but no more. A person who can account for this but at the same time says that he does not share these at all values, would still have the full right to vote and would be welcomed to do so.

With regard to the right to vote, it is also an almost universal principle that it should only cover adult citizens, but not minors. Also this delimitation may then be justified by the fact that the right to vote should be reserved for those persons who can be assumed to have ability to take a well-founded position on issues such as the elected representatives shall decide on. The justification is also supported by the fact that one of the main tasks for it public school is to give students a democratic education.

What has been said should be seen as the basic ideological stance, and that means that one must accept the possibility that adults may lack the right to vote. As for the questions of criteria for citizenship, one can then imagine two possibilities: either that one can be an adult citizen without the right to vote, or that knowledge of the founding members of society values and their use in society must be a prerequisite for citizenship.

These principled positions lead to some interesting questions. What, for example, should apply to children of Swedes abroad about these children has lived outside Sweden throughout his upbringing? They have the right to become Swedish citizens, but it is reasonable that they automatically get the right to vote in Swedish elections when they have reached adulthood age? It could be argued that those who are to participate in national decision-making must have sufficient knowledge of Swedish conditions, including the Swedish foundational values. Such knowledge can not be automatically assumed by those who have had their schooling in one other country.

A similar issue arises in connection with the current debate on citizenship requirements, where many other countries require the ability to master the country national language and knowledge of its social conditions. If so, how to stand for e.g. a woman who is an immigrant and has lived in Sweden in eight years but who has been tied to the home for child care, at the same time as they worked part-time with a routine job without the possibility of language training, either at work or

otherwise? They has done everything that comes to them; should they not be able to become a citizen? But is it reasonable that they also gets the right to vote?

There are many dimensions to that issue, and many may not want to take it grab it because it's so sensitive. But if you still want to reason something about it so there is a need for clear concepts. Then you can either distinguish between different kinds citizenship or on more differentiated requirements for the right to vote. In the former case the immigrant woman in the example could be eligible for a limited citizenship that does not give the right to vote. Newborn children to Swedish citizens would on the other hand, always become a citizen in the usual way, and get the right to vote when the time is right.

If one instead chooses to use special conditions for the right to vote, the children would to Swedes abroad can become Swedish citizens from birth, without special requirements, and in the same way as children of other Swedish citizens. However, the question of voting rights would need to be decided for each such citizen when he becomes of age.

If you choose the first option, only the immigrant woman of the example is affected of this, but in the latter alternative is also affected e.g. child to Swedes abroad. This is a strong reason for choosing it later option.

In addition, there is another reason for the latter alternative, namely the problem that with the current system of elections to the European Parliament, a person who has more than a European citizenship may cast more than one vote, namely one in every country of which he is a national. If one distinguishes between citizenship with and without the right to vote, one could demand that the citizens' registers of EU countries be drawn up so that each person can only have the right to vote in EU elections in one of the countries where they is national.

Well-thought-out and well-motivated rules for the right to vote are important for legitimacy in the democratic elections. But there are also some other factors that are important for this legitimacy. There must be a clear and affordable way to vote for those who do not get it by passing Swedish school, ie both for children of Swedes abroad and for immigrants in all ages. Courses and educational materials are needed, perhaps more than today, but above all, there must be a clear indication from the state that it invites and encourages all citizens who do not already have the right to vote to acquire the knowledge required to obtain this right.

Restrictions must never be a way of denying adults their right to vote, or perceived as such. They can only be demands on knowledge and understanding.

The other important point is that a possible requirement for knowledge of Swedish societal conditions must not be made a requirement for correct opinions. The requirements should include knowing and understanding the content of the current democratic the code, but one should not have to agree on its various parts to get its right to vote.

Non-nationals play an important role

A possible objection to the above reasoning could be that those who do not share them societal values should not be qualified to participate in decisions in a society that is explicitly based on these values. But against this it can be argued that these non-nationals actually play an important role in society. They should not be seen as a troublesome group that you have to deal with tolerate because of some liberal basic principles. The reason is that each community of values, and also society as a whole, feels good to have a few members questioning its prevailing consensus. Those who do not share the foundations of society the values should therefore be welcomed in the general debate; they should feel that their arguments are heard; but they should also be expected to listen the views and arguments of the majority, and that they make an effort to express their views in an understandable way.

For this welcoming of the dissidents to work well, one should never question their right to be citizens or to have the right to vote. However, it is a reasonable requirement, in order to enjoy the right to vote, that the person concerned has familiarized himself with the societal values and that he understands them - but not that the person in question agrees with them.

Civic development of the foundational values

The term "nation" was previously defined as "a community of values that agrees on one foundational values, and which has established or wants to establish a state based on these values'. This leads immediately to the question of how a population should appropriately proceed to define one such a foundational values for itself. For it to then work well both on the card and on long term, it is important that the development is organized in such a way that you get maximum participation in it.

Reference This is no easy task. One can, for example, recall the project during the 1990s to draw up a constitution for the European Union. This project was ambitious in several ways, and also so that there was an attempt to engage the public in the various European countries, but the response was not strong, either from the peoples in general or from many leading politicians. It certainly helped that when some countries presented the draft referendum proposal and it was rejected. A watered-down variant was later accepted as the Treaty of Lisbon, without a referendum at all.

Two conclusions can be immediately drawn from this event and from others similar. For it first, that the development of the foundational values must take place separately in each country, and not at least in countries that have the character of a community of values. Second, the general the discussion on a foundational values must be made concrete, among other things by producing it an (or maybe a few) examples of what can be written in the foundational values. Furthermore,

this or these examples should be written in the form of concrete 'points' on some get lines of text each, along with clarifications or comments if needed. In that way, discussions can focus on arguments for and against a particular point, and on proposals for amendments to some of them.

Such a discussion material can suitably be structured so that there are a few different groups of such points, such as 'premises', 'rights' and 'guidelines' in that way has been done in this writing. The premises may then lay a foundation such as rights and guidelines are based on.

With regard to the rights section, it will be natural to use the UN Declaration on human rights as a starting point, perhaps with some changes from the beginning. Some of its clauses can of course be questioned.

The task of producing a list of socially founding guidelines can be more difficult to handle, because there can be so many suggestions for what to include. At the same time means the goal of broad popular acceptance that the number of guidelines included must not be too large, and that they should be limited to those that are important from a society-based perspective. One way to move forward may be to first gather a large number of proposed guidelines and then choose among them with a systematic method by which redundant guidelines are excluded.

Both the concrete proposals and the rest of the text in the discussion material will need to be used a number of key concepts, in the same way that different concepts have been defined and used in this the scriptures. Such key concepts are important as a conceptual framework, both for the discussion and for the proposal for a foundational values that will eventually be developed. Most of these are key concepts will be familiar from ordinary language, but some of them may need to be introduced and defined specifically for use in the discussion paper. A reason to have such a clear key concept is that it is a nationwide project where local discussions in small or medium-sized groups must be able to contribute to integrative activities at common level. Such cooperation is made more difficult if different groups use different meanings key concepts. Therefore, the discussion material should contain clear definitions of important concepts that it recommends should be used in communication.

In conclusion, systematic and well-thought-out preparations will be needed in order for the joint development of the foundational values to be successful, and in order to implement it with a broad popular participation.

Chapter 11

Human Rights and Citizen's Rights

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is viewed by many as a paramount set of behavior rules in human society. It is widely quoted as a guideline for how problems in society ought to be handled, and it is often used as an argument in protests against social ills. Moreover, several authors have proposed that a common, interreligious platform for Islam and other religions could use the UDHR for its definition of morality. The present chapter shall discuss the UDHR from a paraliberal point of view.

A Brief Review of the UDHR

Reference   The UDHR consists of 30 articles. At least eight of these specify citizens' rights towards the state (Articles 6-11, and Articles 13 and 15). Another seven express the rights of a citizen in the society where they lives (Articles 21-27). Some of the articles claim rights that apply even in the absence of an orderly society. This applies to articles 3, 4 and 5 which relate to the right to life, liberty, personal security and freedom from degrading treatment. It also includes Articles 18, 19 and 20 which refer to the traditional freedoms, ie freedom of speech, freedom of religion and other similar freedoms. Articles 12, 16 and 17 are difficult to place; they treat the right to privacy and family formation, and to own and retain property. The remaining six articles (1, 2, 14, 28, 29, 30) deal with overarching issues, such as the possibilities for restrictions on the stated rights.

In summary, 15 of these 30 articles are clearly oriented towards human rights in state and society, and 6 of them can just as clearly be applied independently of any surrounding society. This is in line with the French declaration of 1789 which concerned the rights of "humans and citizens".

Since the UDHR is concerned with the rights of the individual, it is natural to ask whether it also proposes any obligations for individuals or for citizens. In fact, it does not really treat either possibility, although it does touch on this issue in its Article 29, where the second paragraph reads:

In the exercise of their freedoms and rights, any person may only be subject to such restrictions which have been established by law for the sole purpose of ensuring due regard for and respect for the freedoms and rights of others, and to meet the legitimate demands of a democratic society for morality, public order and public welfare.

This means that according to the UDHR, the state has the right to issue prohibitive

laws, i.e. those that express what one is not allowed to do. Such prohibitive laws may restrict freedoms and rights, although only under certain conditions regarding the enactment of these laws.

UDHR's Relations to Moral Rules and Values

We can now return to the question how the clauses in the UDHR may correspond to moral rules and values, and to the question how the rights of individuals and citizens can be guaranteed and enforced, and finally who is responsible for this to happen. The answer to this is simple with respect to those eight articles that address the citizens' rights towards the state: they can only be realized by organizing the state so that it will operate in accordance with these articles. The separation of powers between the branches of government serves exactly this purpose. The same purpose is served by the provisions in Article 21 which expresses the principles of representative democracy.

With respect to the seven articles that address citizens' rights in society, one must suppose that the state should play an important role in order to guarantee these rights also, although supplemented by efforts from the civil society and by fellow citizens. Article 27 can serve as an example. This article says, among other things, that

Everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to be part of the progress of science and its benefits.

This article expresses a static value since it says *what should be the case* rather than *what people should do.* But this static value generates both a duty for the state (in each context where there is an orderly state), a restriction of human freedom (one does not have an unconditional right to prevent someone from enjoying what is stated in the article), and perhaps also a guideline (everyone who can do so should facilitate for others to take part of what is mentioned in the article).

The classic human freedoms in Articles 18-20 express what one has the right to do, which are often called *negative rights.* The question of what moral rules, attitudes and values may be generated by a negative right is an interesting one, but it does not have a simple answer. Freedom of speech can hardly be a general ban on preventing someone from continuing to speak indefinitely at a meeting, or an injunction to stop one person from speaking in order to make room for another one who wishes to speak there. Nor can it be a reason for a lack of responsibility for what one has said. In the face of all such issues, it is reasonable that restrictions on the freedom of expression must be judged according to their *proportionality,* taking into account both the significance of the stated opinion per se and the consequences of whether and how it is to be expressed. The same

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applies, for example, to the interpretation of religious freedom. Any negative right can apparently generate a guideline that in itself can be quite complex. In addition, many negative rights are also strictly limited by laws and regulations.

An artist's right to publish their art must reasonably be seen as an aspect of freedom of expression in general, which means that even the freedom of an artist and of art itself must be judged according to the principle of proportionality.

With respect to those rights (or more precisely, those notions of human rights) that imply moral rules, static values, or attitudes, one may also inquire whether the correspondence is complete. In other words: can all moral rules and values equally well be expressed in terms of rights, and can all currently recognized rights be re-expressed as moral rules and values?

With respect to the first question, the answer is obviously no, especially since rights are linked to humans. Moral rules and attitudes that serve to protect our nature and our environment can therefore not be re-expressed as rights, at least not within UDHR's framework.

The answer to the second question is in principle also no, because for example Articles 3 and 9 in the UDHR are so imprecise that they can not be re-expressed as guidelines for individual action. These articles say "everyone has the right to liberty" and "no one may be arbitrarily arrested", respectively. On the other hand, one may think that such rights are vacuous anyway. An even clearer example is found in Article 28, which states

Everyone has the right to a social and international order, in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Such a social and international order can only be achieved by the existing states in cooperation, and there is no other party that could deliver this 'right' if those states do not manage to do it.

Reasons for Declarations of Human Rights

Even if there is no complete correspondence between moral rules and values on one hand, and human rights on the other, it seems anyway that many of the human rights that are enshrined in the UDHR can be re-expressed as laws, moral rules and values, and that the other ones have the character of general objectives. Then the question arises why one shall use the concept of rights at all, and why one can not as easily determine what goals one has, what the state is required to do or not allowed to do, and what is mandated, forbidden, or recommended for individuals to do.

Such an approach could include the guidelines and 'virtues' that were proposed in Chapter 3. It could also be compared to that of the *ahkam* (grading) of

actions that is used in Islam, where one distinguishes between *wajib* (mandatory), *mustahabb* (good, recommended), *mubah* (neutral), *makruh* (inappropriate), and *haram* (prohibited).

While considering the purpose of a declaration of rights, it is natural to go back to the reasons why UDHR came into being. The need for it was recognized in connection with The Nuremberg Trials after the Second World War, where individuals were prosecuted for their actions as they held positions of responsibility in the Nazi regime that had just been defeated. Several of them stated in their defense that their actions had been fully in line with the laws that applied in their country when they were performed, and that they had merely obeyed their orders. Their argument that new laws should not be applied retroactively were then met with the argument that they had violated values that were obvious, and therefore universal.

This course of events contributed to the desire to create an international agreement on commonly recognized rights, so that similar abuses would be avoided in the future, and so that they could be prosecuted on a clearer legal basis. One may then ask whether one could not as easily have established an international law that covered the same needs. The real reasons for this can only be speculated on; one factor may have been that a law would have had to be more precise than the fairly sweeping statements in the UDHR. Another factor may have been that the concept of "law" could have opened a Pandora's box of follow-up questions, for example, if there should then be a court, or what should be required to change the law.

Many such problems are avoided by using the term "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" since this introduces something that did not exist before, at least not in any official sense. At the same time, this expression contains several words with a strong positive charge, namely "Universal" and "Human Rights".

The use of these terms has had the effect that the UDHR is sometimes thought to be an expression of natural law, or in any case as the General Assembly's interpretation of natural law. This connection may seem natural since 'natural rights' are often described as rights that are "universal, fundamental and inalienable" (cf the Wikipedia article on natural law). However, the General Assembly itself never expressed any such claims. The introduction to UDHR states that

The General Assembly, Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, ...

Therefore it is clear that UDHR's contents have *been determined* by a treaty and that it is a "common standard". The word 'standard' has a broader meaning in English than in Swedish, and the natural translation can be either "ambition level" or "yardstick". Therefore, UDHR must be seen as an example of legal rights, and not as natural rights. This is also confirmed by Article 29 in the UDHR which

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contains the following point:

In the exercise of their freedoms and rights, everyone may submit only such restrictions, which have been established by law for the sole purpose of ensure due regard for and respect for the freedoms and rights of others and to meet the legitimate demands of a democratic society for morality, public order and public welfare.

By their very nature, natural rights can not be restricted in that way. But if the UDHR can not be considered to be an expression of natural law, and it must be seen as a catalog of legal rights, and where national legislation can sometimes take precedence, what are then the remaining reasons for adopting a declaration of human rights?

Fortunately, there are several. The original motivation from the Nuremberg trial is in fact somewhat sustainable, despite the restrictions in Article 29, because this Article requires that restrictive laws "satisfy the democratic society's legitimate demands..." This means that representatives of a non-democratic regime would not be entitled to invoke this article as an excuse for actions who violated human rights.

Reference

The demands and expectations that the UDHR places on governments are also important reasons, and this is expressed directly in the General Assembly's expressions of "level of ambition" and "yardstick". A concrete example of this is given in a report by UN Human Rights experts as they had visited the Cañada Real slum outside Madrid. They wrote, among other things

The lack of electricity not only violates these children's right to adequate housing, it is having a very serious effect on their rights to health, food, water, sanitation and education.

By this they clearly mean that Articles 25 and 26 of the UDHR are not complied with. This is a clear and interesting example of how declarations of rights can lead to a goal-oriented thinking in moral matters, instead of thinking in static categories. In other words, one does not focus on questions about which actions are correct, mandatory or forbidden, but instead on concrete situations that require action because someone people's human rights are being violated. Fom that point of view, one tries to figure out how to solve the problem. Both authorities, organizations and individuals are then considered to have a general responsibility to contribute in such a situation, but the question of who is going to be responsible for implementing the human rights can come later. The statement of human rights is used for identifying a problem, but not for pinpointing the solution. This can be seen as a paradigm for how a technology-based and therefore complex society

can operate on a moral basis.

Another good reason for the use of UDHR is that it can serve as a reference framework for the political debate within a country, as the previous Swedish archbishop Antje Jackelén has emphasized in an article .

The Declarations of Rights as a Diagnostic Tool

Chapter 2 described an approach as a way of dealing with a situation that has arisen: when a person is confronted with a situation, they chooses an approach to it, guided by guidelines and other values. The example from Cañada Real follows the same pattern: a situation is described and an approach to it is demanded, in this case, an approach on the part of the authorities. It is interesting then that the references to children's rights according to the UDHR can be used as a way of describing a situation and emphasizing its seriousness. More generally, one can imagine a two-part model for moral action, where one part consists of identifying and characterizing a situation that requires action, and the second part consists of formulating and realizing a plan for remedial actions. This two-step model can maybe be used for describing moral action both in individuals and in large organizations.

Such a two-step process is a natural part of the agenda-based model of human behavior that was described in Chapter 1. It stated that "Making plans is a cognitive activity which requires an understanding of the situation at hand, which means that the agent must be capable of recognizing the characteristic features of a situation and integrating them into an understanding of that situation." The observed violations of human rights served exactly as such 'characteristic features' in the example from Cañada Real. This also serves as a reminder that the agent's own values play a decisive role when it makes plans, according to the agenda-based model.

The introduction to this chapter described how human rights statements can imply moral rules, attitudes and values. What has just been said now is that, in particular, they may have an important function for indicating situations that require action, while the choice of actions is considered as a separate issue that can be resolved in its own time.

Declarations of Rights as Foundational Legal Documents

Although the UDHR was explicitly intended as a common level of ambition or yardstick, and not as a kind of legislation per se, there has nevertheless been a movement in the direction of the latter. The same kind of juridification can also be observed in connection with other declarations of rights, and in particular in *the European Court of Human Rights* which is described as follows:

Reference   *This is an international court of the Council of Europe which interprets the European Convention on Human Rights. The court hears applications alleging that a contracting state has breached one or more of the human rights enumerated in the Convention or its optional protocols to which a member state is a party.*

Different member states have different views with respect to this court. One of the contentious points refer to its principle of *margin of appreciation* by which is meant that the court should take differing national views on human rights into account, for several reasons including the protection of the support for their own legitimacy. Other parties object that the 'margin of appreciation' is inconsistent with the idea of an "emerging consensus" between EU Member States, an idea which, on the other hand, is also met with objections. The mentioned website states furthermore:

However, the margin of appreciation doctrine has also come under sharp criticism from jurists and academics who say that it undermines the universal nature of human rights.

The question of the universality of human rights, and whether they should be seen as natural rights or as legal rights are at the basis of this disagreement. – The relationship between UDHR and national legislation has been studied at depth in [dipa-17245] .

Chapter 12

Opposites of the Liberal View of the Individual

What is the antithesis of liberalism, that is, the ideology that is as opposite to liberalism as any can be? Since liberalism is commonly manifested by its views on governance, such as democracy and secularism, it would be natural to look for its opposites among the ideologies that reject those. However, along the lines of the present note where the autonomy of the individual has been identified as the cornerstone of liberalism, doctrines that advocate *consensual submission* should be seen as the distinct opposite of liberalism.

Consensual Submission

Submission is often thought of as submission to force, where someone has to submit to someone or something against their own will. Consensual submission is something else. In its extreme forms it is a state of mind where the person has been deprived of any free will, and where they also does not have any goals of their own, or any agenda for how to achieve goals. This condition may occur in single individuals or in small groups, for example through the use of heavy drugs, or through indoctrination in a religious sect where the submission can be absolute. Besides those extreme varieties, consensual submission occurs when a person submits to directives for all important choices in life, so that only choices of minor importance are made autonomously, and where they experiences this as consistent with their own wishes.

Consensual submission may occur in at least three major forms: 'submission to God', 'submission to Destiny', and 'Resignation'. In the first case, the directives of a personal God have replaced one's own will and displaced one's ability of thinking critically. In fact, the very word 'Islam' is frequently said to mean 'submission to God', where the submission is proposed to be consensual as far as possible. (See e.g. http://submission.net/what-is-islam/). However, submission to God is sometimes proposed in a Christian framework as well. Submission to Destiny is a less obvious concept and it shall be discussed separately.

Reference

Erosion of Rationality and of the Reliance on Knowledge

Our definition of autonomy was stated in Chapter 1:

Independent thinking and acting, based on knowledge and reason, and guided by responsible values and attitudes.

It is natural, therefore, that consensual submission shall often be accompanied by a reduced reliance on knowledge and reason. This may be the result of a successful campaign to erode these facilities in a person or a group, but it may also be a cultural phenomenon that can not easily be explained.

The belief in miracles is one example of how rationality may be eroded. The belief that the suffering of Christ, 2000 years ago, can somehow compensate for sinful or evil acts that are done today and serve to deflect the responsibility of the sinner, is an obvious violation of rational thinking. Likewise, the belief in the possibility of punishment for committed sins by eternal agony in hell violates rational thinking in several ways. In particular, how can there be such a binary choice between hell and not-hell, and where has the line been drawn between one and the other? – The belief in the transsubstantiation of bread into flesh is yet another example of beliefs that violate knowledge and reason.

The adoption of such beliefs may increase a person's willingness to accept other irrational statements as well. However, there are also other ways whereby knowledge and rationality may be eroded. It may occur as the result of an environment in public media where it becomes impossible to distinguish facts from fiction, and where well-founded information can be branded as 'fake news'.

The erosion of rationality and of the reliance on knowledge is a recurrent phenomenon in several kinds of submission, therefore.

Submission to Destiny

Doctrines of consensual submission are often upheld with promises of a forthcoming state of eternal happyness or a Paradise. This is well known in doctrines for the submission to God, but it can also be observed in a doctrine of submission to Destiny where the religious contents are nebulous. This is the case in the thinking of a Russian philosopher, Ivan Ilyin, who published his works between 1916 and 1946, but who did not gain much attention at the time. However, his ideas have gained notoriety in Russia during the reign of Vladimir Putin and in the new millenium. In his book 'The Road to Unfreedom', Timothy Snyder describes how Ilyin's ideas have been interpreted and extended so as to become the leading ideology of Putin's regime. The following paragraphs are a brief summary of pages 21 to 24 of Snyder's book.

Reference

In Ilyin's view, as described by Snyder, the ideal condition is chacterized by harmony, unity, purpose and reason, but the actual world is instead dominated by spiritual and moral relativism, by unthinking purpose, and by passions. The ideal condition existed before God created the world, but God's creation is flawed and it must be redeemed by regaining the perfect condition where everyone is of the same mind. Abandoning the autonomy of individuals is necessary for that to happen; Ilyin wrote that "Evil begins where the person begins". The rejection of

liberalism is evident at once.

But in order to be complete, the story must also define an avenue to redemption in this evil world. For Ilyin, it is Russia and the Russian people that is called to fill this role, since Russia is innocent by its very nature. (The belief in its innocence is an act of faith, and this innocence can not be observed directly). Russia, in this sense, is "an organism of nature and the soul" that has always been threatened and attacked by evil forces from outside itself, and in particular from Europe and America. It still retains an underlying 'Spirit', however, and besides having a right to defend itself, it is also its destiny to extend its worldly power in the interest of universal redemption.

In this conceptual framework, democracy is one of the evil influences from outside. Elections can still be organized, but they shall only serve a ceremonial purpose. Instead, Russia must have an omnipotent ruler, a Czar, who can protect the Russian innocence and lead its defense in both a military and a cultural sense.

Political Resignation

The word 'resignation' has several meaning, but in the present context it shall stand for *an accepting, unresisting attitude, state, etc.; submission; acquiescence* (according to dictionary.com). Such an attitude may occur both on an individual level and in an entire population, as the result of not seeing any meaning or any opportunities in life.

One particular case is *political resignation* where citizens refrain from taking part in the governance of their own country, which means that they do not exercise any political autonomy, and that they abstain from several of the clauses of Section 8 in Chapter 3. This kind of resignation may occur because of repressive policies by the government whereby independent political opinions are suppressed, but the intentional erosion of rationality and of the reliance on knowledge is another method towards the same purpose. Both the lack of trust between citizens and the belief that "everyone lies, so it does not matter what I think" contribute to political resignation.

In his book that was referenced above, Timothy Snyder describes how such an information environment has arisen under the present government in Russia, along with the adoption of Ivan Ilyin's doctrines. One interesting question is then whether this current state of affairs is a necessary consequence of Ilyin's thinking, or whether it should be seen as a modern-day amendment, and as a way of manipulating the citizens in the direction of political resignation. Both of these explanations may be true. "For Ilyin, our world of facts and passions is senseless", as stated by Snyder, and for someone that has that attitude it does not matter what is true and what is false in our world, and telling the truth is not an imperative. Restoring the divine totality is important instead. In that sense, the resignation

with respect to knowledge is a natural consequence of Ilyin's thinking. But at the same time, it is clear by now how the erosion of rationality and of knowledge has started to occur in the Western world as well, and in the United States in particular. It is hard to believe that this is not due to an orchestrated campaign.

Oppression in the Sense of Enforced Submission

Oppression is commonly defined as 'he exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, cruel, or unjust manner', which means that it leads to unconsensual submission. This means that just like consensual submission, it is an opposite of liberalism. Apartheid is an example of a doctrine that promoted the use of oppression.

Submission to God – Religious Integralism

Reference

The term integralism (or integrism) was first used in the Catholic world to denote a view that argued that the state should be subordinate to the 'universal' Christian church, ie the Roman Catholic one. The following quote from a book review gives an insight into what it is all about:

Crean and Fimister ... interpret the "social kingship of Christ" to mean that a just social order cannot exist unless political regimes acknowledge Christ's authority, place their temporal power at the disposal of the spiritual power, and become provinces of a united Christianity. Christendom is "the temporal aspect" of the Church, given flesh with Constantine's conversion, a permanently valid norm rather than a contingent set of arrangements. For them, the modern Church, without Christendom and its temporal sword, is like "a soul separated from the body."

Reference

The view that the quote reflects was prevalent within the Catholic Church in the 19th century, and has its roots far back in time. In 1864, Pope Pius IX declared in the encyclical *Quanta cura* that it is not an ideal system to have a state that is completely neutral in religious matters, and in 1885 Leo XIII in *Immortale Dei* made a number of demands that religion according to him can put on the state. This included, among other things, a distancing from several liberal basic principles:

So, too, the liberty of thinking, and of publishing, whatsoever each one likes, without any hindrance, is not in itself an advantage over which society can wisely rejoice. On the contrary, it is the fountain-head and origin of many evils.

However, Leo XIII's statements on these issues do not claim that the highest representatives of Christendom (such as the Pope) would have any direct influence over states. The influence of Christianity should instead take place within the framework of the political system. In §47 of *Immortale Dei* he states that:

it is unlawful to follow one line of conduct in private life and another in public, respecting privately the authority of the Church, but publicly rejecting it; for this would amount to joining together good and evil, and to putting man in conflict with himself; whereas he ought always to be consistent, and never in the least point nor in any condition of life to swerve from Christian virtue. *Reference*

This is a questionable statement; it is contrary to the attitude of uprightness that was described in Chapter 3. It does not explain why it would be "illegal" for someone who has a position of trust, in the service of the state, for example, if he follows the rules that pertain to this position, even if they are contrary to the person's personal opinion. In such a case, that person would follow the national legislation.

The position of integralism in the Catholic Church weakened during the 20th century, which was confirmed in 1965 when the Second Vatican Council made its declaration on religious freedom through the document *Dignitatis humanae.* In the 2000s, however, integralism has been able to reappear in Catholicism to some extent. At the same time, the concept of integralism or integrism has been extended to be used for similar currents within Islam, especially as in France it is often referred to as *l'intégrisme islamique* or *musulman.* In addition, there are also integrist currents within 'evangelical' Christianity in USA.

Islamic integralism

One clear example of Islamic integralism was provided by Alija Izetbegović who was President of Bosnia during the war in the Balkans in the 1990s. In his essay *The Islamic Declaration* he discusses the current crisis of the Islamic world, and claims that this crisis can only be resolved by the establishment of an *Islamic State,* but he also believes that such a state should not come into being until society has first adopted an *Islamic order* where society, state and religion are fully integrated. This requires a religious renewal followed by a political revolution.

Izetbegović published his Islamic declaration in 1970, for which he was sentenced in 1983 to 14 years in prison while the book was banned although it circulated illegally. It was republished in 1990. However, his thoughts spread in other ways, both to his supporters and his opponents, and the Croatian and Serbian groups in Bosnia reacted strongly to its message. This must be understood as one of the many factors that contributed to the civil war that broke out in 1992. *Reference*

The core point of the Islamic declaration is expressed by Izetbegovic as follows (p. 25 in [Izetbegovic, 1990]

By reserving the right to organize its own world, Islam clearly excludes every competence of a foreign ideology and the possibility of operating within its area. In other words, there is none secular principle and the state must be an expression of and support the moral conception of religion.

Reference

Ahmad Vaezi, who was a chief ideologue of the Islamic revolution in Iran, expressed the same attitude when he wrote, in a monograph that was published in 2004:

Calling people to what is right and preventing injustice is the joint responsibility of the state and its citizens. An Islamic government cannot remain neutral concerning the moral-religious conditions of society. Also, as well as being accountable for affairs such as security, welfare and social order, the government is also charged with maintaining human virtues, common good, morality and religious commitment.

Reference

The social control that Hirsi Ali describes in her book 'Heretic' is then a way for the citizens to exercise this responsibility, but in the first place, integralism is still an approach according to which the state's mission and authority is extended to all key aspects of citizens' way of life. For a religion to be able to constitute a basis for integralism, it must state and enforce a large number of rules that cover virtually all aspects of a person's life. Islam has exactly this quality, according to many of his proponents, The website *aboutislam.net* answers the question "Is Islam a Complete Way of Life?" as follows:

Islam is not a religion in the common, distorted meaning of the word, confining its scope only to the private life of man. By saying that it is a complete way of life, we mean that it caters for all the fields of human existence. In fact, Islam provides guidance for all walks of life - individual and social, material and moral, economic and political, legal and cultural, national and international. - - - newline [Islam] totally denounces this [distorted] concept of religion and clearly states that its objectives are the purification of the soul and the reform and reconstruction of society.

Reference

The website of the 'European Fatwa Council for Halal Transactions' expresses the same thinking with a concise formulation *Islam is a complete package,* and it says further that this view of life is indivisible because *to fraction it into its components, then examine them individually, will yield little or no understanding of*

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Islam's holistic whole. Thoughts like these provide reasons why an Islamic state must 'reserve the right to arrange its own world', as Izetbegović writes.

The Distinction between Integralism and Fundamentalism

The word 'integralism' is not in general use in Sweden, and the approach described above is often called 'fundamentalism'. However, it makes sense to make a clear distinction between them, in line with their respective origins. Integralism has its roots in leadership strata of the Catholic Church that asserted the supremacy of religion over the state. Fundamentalism, on the other hand, arose among the Reformed Christians in the United States who argued that one should return to the original form of one's own religion and purify it, discarding all that had been added over time. Originating in the United States, fundamentalism in this sense had no reason for, nor possibility of asserting the supremacy of religion over the state. In principle, it is also entirely compatible with liberalism, as long as it does not embrace beliefs that are inconsistent with the latter. In this way it differs from integralism which is totally incompatible with liberalism.

In Swedish, the concept of fundamentalism has also come to include integralism since the latter concept is not in general use. For example, the National Encyclopedia gives a description of fundamentalism that first defines it in its limited sense, and then continues:

fundamentalism, in a broader sense: political views and movements that claim that a religion or ideology shall be applied as a social order, independently of the will of the people. This has the effect that the religious or ideological leaders and cadre groups gain a decisive influence over the state institutions and the judiciary.

This definition fundamentalism subsumes Catholic integralism. On the other hand, fundamentalism in its original sense is clearly incompatible with Catholic doctrines since since these have been amended from time to time, throughout its history.

In French, these concepts have sometimes been broadened in the opposite direction, so that 'intégrisme islamique' can also used for Muslim minority groups that are genuinely fundamentalist. A good definition of integralism can be found on the lexicon section of the French website *La Toupie* where it reads, in my translation:

A doctrine which asserts the preservation of [religious] dogmas, seen as an indivisible whole, and of the religious tradition. Integrism developed at the beginning of the 20th century, in Catholic circles who distanced themselves from those who represented modernity and who wanted to see an opening towards modern times.

Reference

63

- - - More generally, and as a distancing, integrism within a religion denotes the approach in those who oppose any change in its dogmas and its traditional customs, and who can go so far as to demand that these be applied in their entirety and in all aspects of life.

This is in line with the earlier quotations above. It includes two main points: firstly, that the doctrines and tradition should not be subject to change other than by a supreme authority (and therefore should not be questioned); and also that people should be made to live entirely according to these regulations. For the sake of clarity, it would be good to use the term integralism for this view, in order to distinguish it from fundamentalism in the precise sense of that word.

A Swedish perspective on integralism

Reference

It seems very unlikely that integralism could gain any ground in Sweden, or for the part of any country that has a Protestant tradition. As for Sweden in particular, the Uppsala meeting in 1593 ruled to assign a well-defined role to the Church of Sweden, whereby it became clear that it was subordinate to the state, and only to the state.

On the other hand, Sweden would of course also be strongly affected if countries that had embraced Catholic integralism were to become an influential group within the European Union. This not likely to happen in a foreseeable future though. – An increased influence for integralism in the USA seems to be a more distinct possibility.

On the Degree of Proactivity with Respect to Values and Morals

Integralism is characterized by a desire that the state shall be consistently governed according to religious values, and that it shall act forcefully so that citizens accept and follow these values in their daily lives. Such a view is of course incompatible with liberalism, but one must not forget that there are intermediate positions between absolute liberalism and absolute integrism. Communitarism is one such intermediate view, and it may be argued that the paraliberal view that has been described in the present book has some resemblance with communitarism. On the other hand, there are also some communitarians, such as David Pearson, who claim that 'communities' must have the right to sanction members that deviate from the community values, namely in order to be able to offer security and safety to the members that conform. Such a view is entirely foreign to the paraliberal view.

In the interval between communitarianism and integrism, one can find a number of sects in various religions, sects that have a substantial repertoire of values

and of sanctions, compared to communitarianism in general. The border area between liberalism and communitarianism, on the other hand, contains those views that fully respect the individual's freedom to choose their own values. At the same time there may also be notions to the effect that this freedom must be balanced with certain expectations. In particular, the paraliberal view places an expectation on the individual to participate actively in value communities (one or more), which is considered necessary for the transfer and the further development of values that are important for society.

Chapter 13

Opposites of the Liberal View of the State

The liberal view of the state was described as follows, in Chapter 6:

- The purpose of the state is to maintain order, to protect its citizens against threats and to guarantee their civic rights, and to provide services for their welfare.

The specific paraliberal view of the state was specified by an amendment to this description. Two other views were also mentioned there, and one of them may be seen as maximally opposite to the liberal view of the state:

- Realistically, and especially over a longer timespan, nations are subject to the law of survival of the fittest. Therefore, although the first two roles are important for a nation-state, the first priority of a nation-state must be to be strong in a variety of ways. In its pursuit of strength it shall strive to dominate other states, in order not to be dominated by them later on.

This shall be called the *imperial* view of the state since it tends to mostly occur in empires or would-be empires. Finally, there is an *ethnic* view of the state's purpose which was described as follows:

- The nation connects past, present and future generations. It acts as a guardian of their cultural traditions, and therefore it is important for the quality of life of the current generation, but this also obliges the current generation to preserve the nation for the benefit of future generations.

This view is a characteristic of ethnic nationalism, and it is possible to combine it with the liberal view or the imperialistic view, but of course not with both. Many proponents of the imperial view combine it with the ethnic view. This has led many liberals to come out strongly against the ethnic view since they believe that it must always be accompanied by the imperial view. This is very unfortunate, since the ethnic view in itself is embraced by so many people; it is in line with the concept of the 'folk' that was introduced in Chapter 7. Therefore, there are strong reasons to adopt the combination of the liberal and the ethnic view of the state. The proponents of *liberal nationalism* take this view.

Characteristic Features of the Imperial View of the State

The history of the world contains a large number of empires, in the sense of states that have expanded by conquering neighboring states and incorporating them, or turning them into vassals. A variety of reasons have been advanced for such a course of action, such as the commands of God, the belief in a manifest destiny, the belief in the superiority of one's own ideology and a wish that other people shall be favored with it, or the belief that conquering the neighbors is actually an act of self-defense. All these cases share an underlying assumption that military force is a legitimate means of achieving the stated objective.

In actual fact, it is safe to assume that the ambitions and the hubris of the ruler and would-be emperor has also been a major reason for the wars of conquest.

All of these reasons are of course illegitimate from a liberal point of view, and it is straight-forward to show how they contradict several of the paraliberal premises. Chapter 3 mentioned the *concertive attitude* as an important guideline, and the *dominance attitude* as its opposite. This dominance attitude underlies the use of brute force for resolving conflicts. Several other guidelines that were proposed in the same chapter are also violated by the imperial view, such as mutuality, and the respect for the dignity of others.

Moreover, and according to all experience, the use of violence and war for resolving a conflict or achieving a goal leads to violation of other important guidelines, such as the freedom of expression, objectivity, appreciation of diversity, and the critical mind. Supremacism and group egoism tend to thrive during wars and civil disorder.

Chapter 14

The Rationale of the Proposed Paraliberal View

This book has described a 'paraliberal view' but avoided using the word 'paraliberalism'. This can be understood by considering the descriptions of two kinds of liberalism:

... market liberalism depicts a political ideology, combining a market economy with personal liberty and human rights in contrast to social liberalism which combines personal liberty and human rights along with a mixed economy and welfare state.

Reference   (From the wikipedia article about 'market liberalism'). These two varieties of liberalism are distinguished by their standpoints on some important political topics, although they share core liberal principles, such as personal liberty and human rights. By contrast, the purpose of the paraliberal viewpoint is not to introduce any analogous addition to the liberal principles. Instead, it represents an attempt to analyze those principles with more formal precision than is usually the case. This has been achieved by clear definitions of terms and by the explicit formulation of premises. Moreover, it is done by proposing specific choices in these respects, instead of attempting an overview of current views in its area.

On the other hand, the present work has also introduced some non-standard views, such as in its definition of the word 'nation', and in its discussion of human rights versus civil rights. But these proposed amendments are not used for the foundation of the paraliberal viewpoint; they shall rather be seen as consequences of the analysis of core liberal principles.

I hope and believe that the paraliberal viewpoint is well in line with most people's views of core liberal principles, with one significant exception which was addressed in the beginning of Chapter 1, namely, the distinction between the ortholiberal and the paraliberal viewpoints. The ortholiberal position is advocated or assumed quite often in the public discourse. Some additional discussion of this topic is therefore appropriate.

Foundational Values and the Declaration of Human Rights

Islamic scholars have traditionally viewed liberal democracy as incompatible with the teachings of Islam, in particular since the Islamic doctrine that 'all power belongs to Allah' is seen as incompatible with the idea of government by the people. Furthermore, it is essential for liberal democracy that laws shall be made by the people through its elected representatives, whereas the Quran and the Sharia

must be the basis for legislation according to Islamic doctrine.

However, this traditional view is now being challenged, for several reasons. The rapid growth of Muslim minorities of immigrants in secular or Christian-secular countries has caused an increased awareness of this conflict, both in the Muslim minorities and in the secular majority. Widespread dissatisfaction with strictly Muslim governments in some countries has also brought this issue to the foreground.

Accordingly, several Islamic scholars have proposed interpretations of Islam together with proposals for how the governance of a democratic state should be organized in order to be compatible with Islamic principles. Such proposals have been made by Edgar Sar and Alphan Telek, Ahmed An-Na'im, Akbar Ganji, Rachid Ghannouchi, and Abdolkarim Soroush, in particular.

One recurring feature in these proposals is that they require the state in question to give particular attention to 'the religion' in the country in question. It is evident that when the authors write 'the religion' they only mean Islam, in particular since this word appears in the singular form. A solution along these lines may be workable in countries with a Muslim majority, but it is hard to see how it could work elsewhere.

Another recurring feature is the idea that the governance principles of liberal democracy should be combined with a declaration of rights, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of the United Nations. There are important problems with this idea, however. For example, endemic corruption in the system of government is incompatible with liberal democracy; this is clear from an abundant number of examples. But there is nothing in the UDHR that speaks out against corruption. More generally, since the UDHR speaks about the *rights* of the individual and the citizen, it does not even touch on what is *expected* from the citizen, which of course is the same as the *morals* that are required in order that the state shall be able to serve its purpose.

The question of morals and values in a liberal democracy has been addressed by Professor Wael Hallaq, of Columbia University. In his book *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament* , he formulates a strong critique of the political culture in Western countries at the present time. He argues that the modern state does not have any moral foundation, and that it is dominated by oppressive forces that deal in commercial exploitation of the population while providing superficial entertainment, and by militant forces that encourage violent behaviors and prepares the population for going to war.

Hallaq expresses his argument mostly on the philosophical level, with few concrete examples. In fact, his description of the modern state may contain some salt with respect to some contemporary states, but much less so for many other states. But apart from those considerations, it is true that the ortholiberal view that was described in Chapter 1 considers that the state shall not be concerned

Reference

with values and morals, since values belong to the personal sphere. Individuals may apply their values when they decide how to vote, and their votes determine what laws get to be enacted, but that is the only way whereby values can influence how the state will act, according to the ortholiberal view. Hallaq's critique is therefore applicable to the ortholiberal view of liberalism.

In the last chapter of his book, Wael Hallaq proposes that an Islamic mindset will be necessary for dealing with the faults of the modern state, but he also makes far-reaching proposals of other kinds. In particular, he describes a forthcoming society where organized 'moral communities' shall play an important role for propagating fundamental values. He objects to the strong emphasis on the rights of individuals in Western society, and proposes to give attention to the 'rigths of communities' as well.

These are a few examples of how the relation between morality and liberalism has become a serious issue in the context of Islam. The same issue arises, although in entirely different ways, when liberal democracy is challenged by authoritarian and illiberal governments, for example in Russia, in Hungary, and by strong minorities in a number of European countries. Meeting these challenges is an urgent task for liberals of all kinds.

The paraliberal view that has been introduced in the present book proposes a framework for dealing with values, morality and secularity in the context of a liberal stance. It is hoped that this text will contribute to current debates about the basic concepts of liberalism and about its future. It is hoped as well that it will contribute to constructive discussions between proponents of liberalism and its open-minded opponents.

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Term Index

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